Vladimir Cvetovic
Media Responsibility of Politicians in Serbia
Abstract: The paper describes the Serbian media during the Yugoslavian War, observing its fluctuant relationship with the Serbian political structures.
Keywords: Serbia; Yugoslavian War; media and politics; censorship
What differentiates today’s potentates from all other potentates in the history of humanity and society? Here is the answer: while all previous potentates paid attention to the deeds of their lieges, today’s potentates pay attention primarily to the thoughts of their lieges.
Duro Šušnjic
The power of the media was recognized very early by politicians as a means of controlling and influencing the public. The last decade of the twentieth century in Serbia showed this power of the media in society and politics in the most brutal way. Censorship, a practice inherited from the past, had an important role in manipulating the public and influencing the behaviour of all: the public, the journalists and the politicians. This paper deals with the issue of censorship in the light of its consequences on the behaviour of the new political elite, and examines the media after the breakdown of the authoritarian regime in Serbia, the last one in the Balkans. The behaviour of Serbian politicians, who tend to rely on censorship in some aspects of public life, can be treated as a heritage of the past. Therefore, the first part of this paper focuses on a brief analysis of the characteristics of media-constructed reality, with special attention to the place of internal censorship. Additionally, media legislation, together with legal and political practices related to the media, is also covered, since it established the circumstances in which a media communication culture was created. In the second part of the paper I shall give some examples regarding the behaviour of the new Serbian political elite, whose origins are in the previous period, and its tendency to perpetuate practices that are characteristic of authoritarian rather than democratic rule. Nevertheless, I shall start this paper with some general remarks about the media and censorship.
Ideology, propaganda and censorship
In a capitalist society (though not exclusively), media play an important ideological role in legitimising the system. However, ideological control through the media is not firm, but rather informal and implicit, with imperfect effects. Political leaders often blame the media for political problems (caused by politicians) because it is very difficult to keep the editorial policies of different media under total control, and the information released by some authority is usually distorted before it can reach the audience. Therefore, the media can somewhat overcome the influence of one particular interest group. The media offer a socially-shared established viewpoint, articulated somewhere in the interaction between many social subjects (see more in Parenti, 1993). In countries undergoing transition, the role of the media can be even larger, since changes in the political and economic systems are accompanied by the deconstruction of ideology and value ladders attached to it. Here the media can be a very important agent for articulating a new ideology and value system. Opinion leaders and politicians in transitional countries are probably the most influential in this sense, and have immense responsibility in the public sphere because they have to change the practice of mass communication and to set the basis for a new public communication culture.
Unlike capitalism, socialism used firmer, more brutal ways of controlling the media and publicly available information. A case from former Yugoslavia is relevant in this sense, since censorship became much more widespread after the country’s breakdown (see more in Thompson, 1994). Whereas in capitalistic democratic societies the editorial policy sets the priority of the news, and selects the information that should or not be published (justified by the importance of some news items over others), in socialism news selection was made on the basis of its lucrative potential for the collective interests1; the information that might be detrimental to such interests was simply forbidden openly and by force. This does not mean that censorship is not present in democratic capitalist societies, but there it is countered by the culture of the freedom of information and by the numerous groups that fight against restricting the information area. Thus, censorship on the media usually comes from external sources, from various powerful interest groups such as the government in politically centralized societies, some informal or even criminal groups, and groups with particular economic interests, etc. The second characteristic of censorship is that it is imposed by pressure and force, and if some media or journalist should break restrictions, they face repression, which leads us to the problem of self-censorship.
The simplest and safest means by which the media or journalists can avoid repression is to impose self-censorship. Contrary to censorship which is imposed from external sources, self-censorship is an internally regulated way of behaviour. “Journalists will treat their self-censorship as a matter of being ‘realistic’ or ‘pragmatic’ or ‘playing by the rules.’ In their ability to live in a constant, if not always conscious, state of anticipatory response while maintaining an appearance of independence, newspeople are not much different from professionals in other hierarchical organizations” (Parenti 1993:41). As a result, self-censorship becomes a part of a culture influencing the communication practice of a society.
Media regulation and practice in Serbia
This communication practice has two main aspects, or rather areas in which it is manifested: the already mentioned journalists, and the audience, or the media consumers. In the long run, media-created reality, no matter how big the discrepancy between it and the real life, becomes a very important factor in any citizen’s everyday life. People’s cognitive schemas, created under incessant long-term impact of selected and censored information, are usually very resistant to changes, even when full access to information is allowed. There is no critical attitude toward information provided by the media, or there is significant distrust in the media in general, or just in some of them. Therefore, the fact that after the liberalization of the press at the beginning of the 90s, people in Serbia found themselves aligned as readers of either Politika (the government’s newspaper), or Telegraf or Blic (independent, pro-opposition journals) is not out of the ordinary. A significant number of readers in Serbia simply continued to follow the same source of news as before (the Communist Party, transformed into the new Socialist Party of Serbia, took over the main media), disbelieving the media founded after 1990. However, even the audience of these new media in Serbia were/are affected by the system that existed before the 90s. While before the changes everyone knew what should or should not be published and claimed publicly, and what language should be used, new circumstances brought potential freedom and width, but only with vague and imprecise ideas about basic communicational rules. This lack of any elaborated rules for practice influences the behaviour of all: the politicians, the media, and the public. However, the question remains: whose responsibility is it to change this? Here we have two contenders, politicians and the media: for certain aspects of culture it is politicians who are responsible, as public figures, whereas for some others it is journalists and editors who are responsible.
The environment in which the media in Serbia used to function, the environment that influenced the communication culture in Serbia can be treated as political interventionism over the media; it can therefore be accounted for as engendered by politicians (not only as public figures who claim something publicly, but also as an interest group which can go to such lengths as to forbid the work of some media). Independent media in Serbia were experiencing different kinds of pressure and hardship, some of the most significant being imposed through legislative and economic regulations and practices.
First of all there was an (extremely repressive) Public Information Law issued in 1998, which was at variance not only with international regulations, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but also with the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia. The information law was specifically aimed at controlling the independent media in Serbia, and at establishing censorship on a legal basis. The following three points highlighted in an analysis conducted by Marijana Filipovic (Filipovic, 2000:18) represent the best illustration.
Articles 3 and 30 require the press (both printed and broadcast media) to publish/ broadcast only information that is entirely true. If they do not succeed in reaching this goal, the author, editor, publisher, or broadcaster carries personal responsibility for the truthfulness of information.
Articles 42 and 50 provide censorship actions against the press, which would include both pre- and post-publication sanctions.
Articles 67 and 69 of the Public Information Law provide punishments for violations of Articles 2 and 42. These punishments mainly include fines, which do not meet the ‘proportionality’ requirement in respect to the harm that was done. Fines are also to be paid for “broadcasting or re-broadcasting programs of a political-propaganda nature in Serbian or in any of the recognized national minorities’ languages” (Article 27).
The part of the Law which regulated the work of media during the war was even more explicit, introducing censorship openly (Articles 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, and 15). There was a restriction on reporting from the battlefield, which included a ban on giving information about loses incurred by the Yugoslav Army and Police. The Law also gave instruction as to how the language should be used while reporting on a conflict and the sides involved (Filipovic, 2000:19). Hence, armed Albanians in Kosovo were called terrorists, refugees from Kosovo during the conflict were described as Albanian victims of the NATO campaign, and NATO soldiers were described as the dogs of war.
The application of the Public Information Law had a dramatic outcome for the freedom of expression, imposing extremely high sentences in terms of money primarily. The trials for alleged crimes committed by the media were conducted in an express manner, and the reasons invoked included critical coverage on the activities of the country’s power structures. The Evropljanin weekly magazine was found guilty of blaming the president of FRY for the country’s bad situation. On October 24th 1998 this magazine was fined with around $150.000 (Filipovic, 2000:22). For similar reasons were punished also editors and journalists, with sums that exceeded their salaries many times. Fortunately, this repression did not last long enough to completely diminish the alternative view offered by the independent media.
The other aspect of media behaviour is a consequence of the lack of appropriate rules that would regulate the basic professional standards. The essential problems of Serbian journalism were the reason for publishing the Ethical Code, a handbook made by the Independent Association of Serbian Journalists. “It was in fact, a response to the voices which expressed doubts on the question – is there any rule in our profession, or is everything allowed?” (Bogoeva, Rokvic, Vojnovic, 1999:5). The main aim was to conduce to the education of journalists and advancement of the profession. By giving an overview of the media codes in 26 out of 28 European countries, the authors categorized the content of these codes under six categories. Among them, two appear to be the most important and the most exhaustive: the responsibility of the media and journalists toward the public (citizens), and the protection of the integrity of the profession from any external influence (ibid. 17). Although these analysed codes belong to Western Europe mainly, it is obvious that even in the countries with a solid tradition of free press the most problematic issues are the same as in countries without any tradition of independent journalism. Of course, these problems have specific characteristics in the West and somewhat different features in the former socialist countries. The situation in Serbia was among the most difficult compared to all other European countries, because the “clash between declared objectives and clandestine resistance was perhaps the most clearly expressed” (Thompson, 2000:6).
To complete the picture we have to pinpoint the main characteristics of media reporting in Serbia before the elections in 2000. One can find two interpretations of reality: one given by the regime and the other given by independent media. Therefore, the contents of pro-regime Politika and independent Glas Javnosti (Voice of the Public) give us two significantly different stories.
Reality as presented by Politika was oriented towards Russia and China, putting them in a very positive light, while Western countries were depicted as threatening. Furthermore, Russia and China were seen to have a very decisive role in international affairs, as well as the power to dictate the world’s politics. On the other hand, reports about any cooperation between the West and the above-mentioned countries were scarce. Moreover, if there was any kind of official agreement between Russia and the United States about issues concerning Yugoslavia, there was no report on that but on the reaction of Russia’s anti-American opposition. As far as reporting on internal affairs was concerned, there was an almost complete absence of coverage on the political parties which formed the opposition. These parties were mentioned only as exponents of the west or of the forces which went against Serbian national interests. Both the West and the opposition were the main perpetrators responsible for the bad situation in the country. Everything was justified by national interests, and national interests were strongly linked with the regime as the ‘only guarantee’ of national sovereignty, freedom and prosperity.
Glas Javnosti presented more Western-centred views, whereby the US and Western Europe played the key role in international affairs, also decisively influencing Serbia’s internal affairs. The presence of numerous articles on activities of the opposition parties, as well as on informal anti-regime groups such as NGOs, set up a completely different context for the government’s activities. The West was depicted in a much more positive light than in Politika. For example, in Glas Javnosti there was a clear link between the crisis in Kosovo (this was in 1998) and international sanctions against Yugoslavia, and the role of Serbian/ Yugoslav government in creating the country’s disastrous internal as well as external situation. In Politika, there was no reference to any event (the Serbian policy in Kosovo, for example) as a reason for introducing the sanctions. In order to avoid somehow the threat posed by the Information Law, Glas Javnosti resorted to different authorities, politicians, economists, foreign celebrities and professionals, etc. to criticize the government. However, at the time even such tactics were not sufficient to prevent punishment for ‘disobeying’ written and unwritten rules.
Comparing the two newspapers, one can see how important censorship was for the previous government, in order that it might gain and retain control over the public opinion. The same content which is presented in Politika looks absolutely different put in the context of all relevant information. This alternative view given by independent media significantly diminished the influence of the government’s propaganda, and the only way to cope with that problem was, for the state officials, to unify the media. Therefore, the control and repression of the independent sources of information and the media until September 2000 were constantly tightened.
After the changes
What has changed with the new government? First of all, the new Serbian government (the ruling political force, DOS, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, is a coalition of 18 political parties) built its image on the opening of the country, especially toward the West. The message that these parties are sending all the time is that Serbia/ Yugoslavia is a part of Europe and, as such, it must be a modern democratic state. They are constantly insisting on the right for free access to information, and the need for independent and critical media, criticizing the politics of censorship. The way from criminalized autocratic rule to the ‘modern country of western democracy’ is claimed not to be easy, but definitely reachable. On the other hand, the former opposition, which has preserved its name even under the new circumstances (the Democratic Opposition of Serbia), had strong support from the Western European countries and the US before the elections, and this support has continued ever since. Shortly after the elections Yugoslavia became a member, or at least was granted a privileged status in many international organizations, and citizens have been able to see the results of the new policies. This huge international support and economic help from the West has additionally obliged the government to comply with the rules of modern western democracies. Consequently, the new government could not even imagine introducing any kind of open censorship, as the previous regime did.
Under these circumstances (the process of integration into international institutions, and ten years of authoritarian rule which set some ‘standards’ of political game), it might be expected that there has been some receding into the past, particularly when the new politicians came to unpleasant issues and topics; censorship, nevertheless, has had to be as covert as possible. Basically, there are two options: because open censorship of specific information is out of the question, politicians can try to invoke the self-censorship of journalists by ‘advising’ publicly whether some published information or issue could be dangerous or bad for the national interests. This could be good tactics, since the journalists from the pro-regime media developed this kind of self-censorship during the previous years, and they would just have to adjust to the new politicians in heeding to what could be sanction-proof reporting. The second way to control the media is even more efficient, because it counts on editors or journalists loyal to certain political factions within DOS, who will convey the desired editorial policy. In this case, politicians have to lobby for their purposes, and to offer some privileges to the editors or journalists. However, I will focus here only on this visible appeal to self-censorship, namely, to the politicians’ advice as to what could be an appropriate editorial policy, through suggestions concerning what issues and information might be best to avoid in public.
The other aspect that also influences the media’s credibility – the lack of a communication culture and the public figures’ liability for this (including the media as authorities in public opinion moulding) – is indivisible from the previously mentioned problem. Politicians in Serbia have very often made statements that were not checked beforehand, or adequately prepared for publication. Of course, there is always the journalists’ or the editors’ responsibility to additionally check some information, or to prepare it in an adequate way for publication, but my intention here is to focus on politicians. The reason for this lies in already mentioned fact that they bear most of the burden for changing practices in the media, by modifying the law (which has not been changed, but at least is not used anymore), and showing, through personal examples, what correct communication practices mean.
Three interesting events that became big public affairs are the best illustration of the above mentioned: the case of assassinated former policeman Gavrilovic, the affair about the law on extra profiteers and the published list of the profiteers’ names, and finally the issue of the mass-graves of Kosovar victims.
The Gavrilovic affair started when the Blic daily newspaper published on its front page a story about some documents that Gavrilovic had given to Yugoslav president Koštunica on the day of his assassination. These ‘documents’ allegedly contained some proofs about the connections between the Serbian political leaders and organized crime in the country. The newspaper published this information as received from a confidential source, presumably from some person close to president Koštunica. At that time disputes between the two most influential factions in DOS (the Democratic Party to which Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dinidic belonged, and the Democratic Party of Serbia to which Yugoslav president Vojislav Koštunica belonged) were amongst the main political topics, and this story simply served to kindle this dispute. From initial ‘proofs’ of the connection between criminals and politicians, after a few days only some accusations and suspicions about the poor performance of the Serbian government (which were already obvious to the public, and partly already stressed by the media) remained; the assassination was used only for political purposes. As far as media are concerned, this story is interesting on two accounts. After publishing the story, Blic editors and journalists were summoned to the police headquarters for questioning, at around the same time when the Serbian minister of police was promising that the authorities would not force the newspaper to reveal the source of its information. This event reinforced public suspicion that the new government did not to have full control over the Serbian police, and that the threat of repression was still present. Fortunately, after this first excess, the focus moved from Blic to a quarrel between politicians, which in fact posed another question: was this newspaper used for some political games? One public statement of the Independent Association of Serbian Journalists is pretty much in line with the posed question. The Association warned that there was ongoing pressure on the media in Serbia, but also advised the media that they should be cautious not to become involved in situations which could compromise them, and turn them into an excuse for heated political debates (Blic, 14 August, 2001). State Security Service Chief of Cabinet claimed that the ‘Gavrilovic case’ was a subject of media manipulation (Politika, 31 August, 2001).
The second example is related to publishing the list of extra-profiteers who were supposed to pay special taxes because they had earned money under the previous regime and had been profiting from some privileged position. The law that should regulate this was conceived as an act of social justice, in the sense that those who had been making huge profits had to pay a tax which would be used to cover social expenses. After the list of enterprises and persons that should pay this tax appeared in the media, another public discussion started, this time about the correctness of such an act (publishing the list). The main argument, which could be partly justified, was that the list resembled to some extent the practices of the previous regime and its lists of those who deserved public condemnation. However, this was also a necessary quest for justice. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dinidic brought the soundest arguments against publishing the list, arguing that it could harm the safety of some citizens and their reputations. In reply, Mladan Dinkic, Governor of the Federal Bank, claimed that Dinidic was under pressure (from some of the tycoons) to withdraw the list (Blic, 26 July, 2001). Although directed to Dinkic, the Prime Minister’s call was also an indirect call to the media to avoid this hot issue. However, Dinkic, as well as the commission that had compiled the list and made it public without thorough checking, also had some share of the blame. Negligence resulted in mentioning one family on that list, though that family had used the money received under special terms for a medical operation of blind twins (they were removed from the list after the intervention). The biggest concern related to this issue was raised after broadcasting a video clip where the faces of the main extra profiteers appeared for the first time on state television. This video clip was instantly removed, and journalists from this TV station had to ‘put ashes on the heads’, claiming that everything had been a big mistake and a bungled job of inexperienced new employees. “RTS (Radio Television of Serbia) does not function in such a way that everything is under control; hence, excesses of this type are possible. The mistake was not broadcasting the video clip, but the way in which the clip was made. Everything was like propaganda action and that is the reason why the problem appeared” – these were the words of Aleksandar Crkvenjakov, chief editor of RTS (NIN, 26 July, 2001). Again, there is overt intention on the part of politicians to avoid publishing some information, and on the other hand, inappropriate practice standards of media professionals, but also of officials from the Federal Bank in preparing the information for the public.
Finally, there was the notorious affair of mass graves found on several locations in Serbia, where the victims of the Kosovar war had been buried by the previous regime in order to hide its crimes. Therefore, it is not strange that the parties that were in power at the time when these crimes and cover-ups happened should have criticised the action of revealing such facts. They claimed that the whole thing was framed, that there were not so many bodies as it was alleged, that everything should stop because it was not in Serbia’s best interest (Mirjana Markovic in Politika on 25 July, 2001), etc. In this context, it is interesting to analyse the statements made by Yugoslav president Koštunica on several occasions (for example at his regular press conference held on 24.05.2001), when he claimed that the information about these mass graves was not accurate and that even public mentioning of that issue was detrimental to the national interest. Besides the fact that Koštunica indirectly insisted on self-censorship of state officials and the media, he did not make a clear distinction between the previous regime and the new governments (republic and federal). This attitude also had firm support from the public, consolidated during the previous 10 years through constant propaganda; the responsibility of perpetuating a basically similar political message is very serious. One survey published in Politika on 30 July 2001 on the question of whether “war crimes and mass graves should be obliterated or not”, showed that 44.7% citizens of Serbia thought that there had been war crimes committed by the Serbs, but that the others (Croatians, Muslims, etc.) had committed even more. However, almost 28% considered that the revealing of mass graves was a shameful act and that it had to be stopped immediately. These attitudes are likely to be strengthened if they are supported by persons with high reputation.
One more example is illustrative in relation to censorship. A documentary movie about the massacre in Srebrenica committed by the Yugoslav Army forces was broadcast on the state TV on Wednesday 11th July, 2001. The very next day a regular session of the Serbian assembly was dedicated to this event at the request of the opposition, the parties which had been in power at the time when the massacre took place. The opposition demanded that the people responsible for that broadcast – which had laid such blame on the Serbs – should be identified. In a reply, the DSS (a party of president Koštunica) phrased the question differently: who had blamed the Serbs for committing those crimes? Concurrent with this ongoing debate, the state television started to reprise the documentary, which was, however, aborted when a break in the assembly session started. There was no explanation why this broadcasting was aborted or at whose request.
Conclusion
These examples show something that could be named as uncertainty in the roles that should be played in the new circumstances. On one hand, they wanted to behave in a responsible, professional and democratic manner. The main actors of the mentioned affairs, Koštunica and Dindic, stressed the importance of independent and professional media on many occasions, but in some aspects they would rather make use of some advantages that only practices inherited from the previous regime could confer. On the other hand, the problem of educating journalists and editors came into focus, since there was no longer strong political control that would ‘prescribe’ ways of reporting. The way in which information is presented, as in the case of broadcasting the video on profiteers, is crucial because under loose (political or economic) control, media professionals must introduce self-control under a professional code or some similar positive regulations. That would also be one of the ways of preventing censorship, by not allowing some external groups to lay down the rules for the media.
The general conclusion is that the new circumstances in Serbia are much more favourable to the media, but the situation is still relatively critical: the institution of independent media is not very strong yet. However, a good aspect of the political constellation in Serbia is that the ruling coalition is much more diversified. Among the coalition partners it is not strange to see opposite approaches or attitudes toward certain issues. This should ensure mutual political control in following democratic rules and fair play, which would subsequently have positive consequences on the media. The pluralism of public voices is the best way of preventing manipulation, which has also proved to be true in the case of Serbia. The previous regime tried to take complete control over the public information area because propaganda could not be efficient enough. A paradigmatic example is the period of the Kosovar conflict, when war propaganda had full effect on the public at the beginning (people were confused, frightened, informed mainly from one source, namely the state), but started to decline when people began searching for and listening to alternative sources of information provided by foreign news services, such as Deutche Welle or Voice of America.
While questioning ways of preventing censorship as enforced not by media professionals but by some external sources (different interest groups), we should not neglect the role of media and market professionals. The media market poses demands for different types of content and information, and different segments of audience can justify alternative information, approaches or viewpoints. Additionally, media professionals are not a homogeneous professional group (the majority of modern positive regulations give journalists the right not to work for the broadcasting company whose editorial policy is in collision with the journalist’s personal feelings.
To sum up, it is hard to believe that censorship in Serbia will be eradicated, since those who have the responsibility to do that, namely politicians, would rather follow their own interests and find ever more sophisticated and invisible ways of maintaining some degree of control. Therefore, pluralism of the media and the interest groups behind them is the most realistic aim, which can provide the basis for monitoring the problem of censorship and media professionalism through a mutual control of the media actors.
1 Collective interests are usually defined in a very vague way, which allows the regime to interpret them in accordance with daily or other specific political needs.
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