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Dystopia Revisited: Biopolitics as Remedy and Response to Philip K. Dick’s *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*

**Abstract:** Philip K. Dick’s science fiction classic *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* and its adaptation movie *Blade Runner* by Ridley Scott feature a devastated earth where bounty hunter Rick Deckard stalks authentic human replicants, designed for a short term highly flexible labor power. A group of these androids infiltrate to the earth of the productive apparatus which manufactured them, trying to persuade their maker to re-program their genetic makeup. Biopolitics as conceived by Roberto Esposito is apt at exploiting the reserves of sense present in Dick’s critical scenario, and managing the mixing of languages of politics and biology, which originally were kept apart in the dystopic dimension of the novel and in the political philosophy tradition. Discarding the frontal approach to the categories of politics, Esposito urges to interrogate the categories of politics obliquely, thus entering the hidden layers of their meaning, fostering an innovative coexistence of opposites.

**Keywords:** Philip K. Dick; Ridley Scott; Posthumanism; Biopolitics; Android; Empathy; Immunity.

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This story starts in 1942, when Clive Staples Lewis asserted that if there ever came a time when humans were treated as “conditioned material”, then a “world of post-humannity” would ensue. Clive Lewis was a literary scholar and also an Anglican lay theologian; he held academic positions in English literature at both Oxford and Cambridge Universities. Today he is best known as the author of *The Chronicles of Narnia*, but he also wrote non-fiction Christian apologetics, such as *Mere Christianity*, *Miracles*, and *The Problem of Pain*.

Lewis was a close friend of J.R.R. Tolkien, the author of *The Lord of the Rings*. Both men served on the English faculty at Oxford University and were active in the informal literary group known as the Inklings. Lewis’s faith profoundly affected his work, and his wartime radio broadcasts on Christianity brought him wide acclaim.

In Lewis’ post humanity, man’s conquest of himself simply means the rule of the conditioners over the conditioned human material. Some consciously, others unconsciously, nearly all men in all nations are laboring to produce the world of
post-humanity and, according to this view of post-humanity, we are all heading for a dystopic condition. Why is Lewis so relevant for dystopia? Because it was Lewis and his attitude towards the post-human element that set the tone for the debate about what is human and what is not. Tolkien’s imagination of an archaic mass society in *The Lord of the Rings* dealt with the same dilemma regarding the future of the West with which, earlier in the Twenties, Spen-gler and his followers had grappled.

Why, then, choose science fiction, in order to refute Lewis’ allegation? Because, as Walter Benjamin maintains, what is at issue in literature is not merely the relation of literary works of art to the historical context of their origin, but rather how literature is interpreted in a specific epoch, and how criticism later develops. Thus literature, science fiction included, becomes an organon of history in the process: memories are like biographical relationships to people, and history is like a series of entrances into a labyrinth.

These entrances I call primal acquaintances; each of them is a graphic symbol of my acquaintance with a person whom I met, not through other people, but through neighborhood, school comradeship, mistaken identity, companionship on travels, or other such—hardly numerous—situations. So many primal relationships, so many entrances to the maze. But since most of them—at least those that remain in our memory—for their part open up new acquaintances, relations to new people, after some time they branch off these corridors (the male can be drawn to the right, female to the left). Whether cross-connections are finally established between these systems also depends on the intertwinenments of our path through life.

Trying to describe and illustrate the sense of humanity in a secular context, Benjamin recalls episodes and the social life of his early childhood in the *Berliner Chronicle*, producing a hypothesis which explains the core nature of human experience: this is not an essential or metaphysical notion, but rather consists in the human capacity to interact, to establish relationships of all sorts and thus expand the idea of a community in all its various, even contradictory and factitious forms. It should not be forgotten that all of Benjamin’s texts were conceived to work out “the relationship between politics and time. To neglect the political or to reduce it to no more than its named presence fails to grasp that what is at stake within these writings is a political and philosophical engagement with the exigencies of the present itself. The clash, for example, between historicism and modernity is not a question of choice. Not only is such a conflict staged between different political possibilities, the conflict is itself part of the definition of modernity.”

Modernity is therefore intertwined with the distinction between what is part of the social terrain we define as society and something else, a sphere with vague outlines, which remains outside of what Freud considers *Heimlich*, or habitable. In recognizing a discontinuity in the idea of the interior, Benjamin reflects on the “difficulty in capturing the eternal conception of dwelling as a precise historical condition of the nineteenth century. This is where the arcades [of *The Arcades Project*] become
indispensable in thinking about the interior. While arcades embody technological, commercial and spatial developments of the nineteenth century, dwelling appear to stand outside of time\textsuperscript{3}. The interior then is short lived, its life span covers just the nineteenth century and it is then mercilessly obliterated by twentieth century modernism. The in-betweenness of the interior corresponds to its inability “to distinguish the animate and the inanimate, the living and the dead. The Jugendstil artist/architect begins to assume the role of total designer, taking up the tectonic elements of new construcational forms, and naturalizing them with a distinctly animated and vegetal stylistic line”\textsuperscript{4}. This technological and heuristic convergence can be considered the final expression of “discontinuity [as] the stigma of temporal dislocation that it was the historian's task to remove from history. It has now become one of the basic elements of historical analysis”\textsuperscript{5}. And this is the intersection at which Walter Benjamin’s and Philip Dick’s paths cross.

Over the twenty years in which I have published novels and stories I have investigated these two interrelated topics. What are we? What is it which surrounds us, that we call the not-me, or the empirical or phenomenal world? My two topics are really one topic; they unite at this point. Fake realities will create fake humans. Or, fake humans will generate fake realities and then sell them to other humans, turning them, eventually, into forgeries of themselves. So we wind up with fake humans inventing fake realities and then paddling them to other fake humans\textsuperscript{6}.

We have an extensive bibliography centered on the posthuman, from Robert Pepperell’s \textit{The Post-Human Condition} (1995), to Francis Fukuyama's \textit{Our Posthuman Future} (2002), Jon Huer’s \textit{The Post-Human Society} (2005), and Bruce Clarke’s \textit{PostHuman Metamorphosis} (2008). However, years before these books, Philip Dick wrote about the same themes which would later be theorized by post-humanity scholars. He joined all those scientists who warned society against becoming posthuman, but, unlike intellectuals and other writers like Lewis and Tolkien, he did it from a secular, not religious view.

In \textit{Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?} we do not have humans who surrender to the machine’s dominion, but rather frightened, neurotic individuals who, on the backdrop of a post atomic war catastrophe\textsuperscript{7}, manufacture their surrogates and substitutes in the form of androids. Hence Dick’s two topics – the first about what is reality and the second about the nightmares of “humans” – become one.

It is my contention that Dick’s novel foreshadows the critical situation in which we find ourselves today: the ever-increasing concern with the life of individuals leads to an extreme politicization of biology; power revolves around body politics. Therefore, biopolitics becomes the key to comprehending how both the utopian or the dystopian visions that characterize the works by Lewis, Tolkien and Dick function.

Roberto Esposito’s original understanding of biopolitics fits into this context. The Italian philosopher’s texts on this much debated discipline and political praxis provide us with one of the most
sophisticated, historically-informed and effective instruments to understand the contradictions that coexist in Dick's attitude towards humans and not humans. Esposito's relation of community and immunity is in fact one of contrast and juxtaposition, exactly as in Dick's novel, and this relationship can eventually be part of a larger move in which each term is inscribed reciprocally into the logic of the other.

The history of Science Fiction is the result of two conflicting tendencies. A potential cognitive tendency, quite evident in all the significant writers who dealt with (More, Lucian, Cyrano, Verne, Wells, Capek, etc.), is allied to the rise of subversive social classes and their development of more sophisticated productive forces and cognitions. However, an opposed tendency toward mystifying escapism dominates in second rate science fiction and shows even in the masters (the statics of More and Swift, the catastrophism of Mary Shelley and Wells, the positivism of Verne) formed as it is by the practical and cognitive limitations of fiction steeped in the alienation of class society and in particular by the stagnation of a whilom subversive class.

What is really human and what is fake? In his writings Dick works out a distinction between the schizoid and the android, never confusing the two categories. In a 1972 essay he reflects on the blurred distinction between humans and machines maintaining that “We are merging by degrees into homogeneity with our mechanical constructs.”

Does the modern individual tend to become a robot? Yes and no. Then, gradually, this person begins to separate people into schizoids and not schizoids. Who are the first group, the schizoids? He claims that a schizoid is a person who lacks proper empathy just like an android. Dick is therefore talking about a deranged or disturbed person. But, first and foremost, he is not talking about essence, but rather about behavioral differences.

According to Paul Sammon, who interviewed Dick about Blade Runner, the latter created androids in order to single out all those who behaved in a not human way. In a sense, androids were originally metaphors for humans not behaving properly; initially, they were just people who were considered not really honest. Dick claims that he has investigated humans and fake humans over the twenty-seven years in which he has published novels and stories and these two topics are actually one single topic, since they unite at one point. He is convinced that fake humans can generate fake realities and then sell them to other humans, turning them, eventually, into forgeries of themselves.

An artist and polemicist like Robert Pepperel points out that all this talk about post-humans:

marks the end of that period of social development known as Humanism; in this sense it means ‘after Humanism’. Secondly, it is used to refer to the fact that our own view of what constitutes a human being is now undergoing a profound transformation. Thirdly, the term refers to the general convergence of organism and technology to the point where they become indistinguishable.
According to McInnis, Dick’s *Do Androids of Electric Sheep* is an attempt to warn society against the risk of becoming posthuman: androids can be physiologically similar to humans and represent people, but cannot be sympathetic. However, the decline of humanity in the novel is related precisely to the inability of ordinary people – humans – to express feelings.

In a conversation with a colleague android bounty killer Rick [Deckard] said: ‘I’m capable of feeling empathy for at least specific, certain androids […] of course, he reflected, this may never come up again in my work; it could be an anomaly, something for instance to do with my feelings for *The Magic Flute*. And for Luba’s voice, in fact her career as a whole. Certainly, this had never come up before […] So much for the distinction between authentic living humans and humanoid construct […] he said to himself, I rode with two creatures, one human, the other android… and my feelings were the reverse of those intended. Of those I’m accustomed to feel – am *required* to feel.\(^\text{13}\)

Yet it is precisely this idea of human and not human that lies at the core of a distinction from which a utopia or a dystopia can originate: the concepts that appear obvious to us, are the outcome of a long process of Foucauldian discipline that ran through ancient and modern history, changing history in its course.

When the Roman jurist Gaius, in his *Institutiones*, identified persons and things as the categories that, together with actions, represent the subject matter of the law, he gave legal value to a criterion that was already accepted in common sense, and that nobody would have denied. Since Roman times, this distinction has affected all kinds of codification, providing the ground for legal but also philosophical, economic and ethical reflection. Such a watershed divides the world and defines everyday life, cutting it into two opposed areas, and you either stand on the side of the persons, or on the other side, with the things: and yet Esposito observes that “More than mere tools or objects owned as private property, things constitute the filter through which humans, not yet modeled by the dispositive of the person, enter into relationship with each other”\(^\text{14}\). As a consequence, we are living in a world of paradoxes since “If there is one assumption that seems to have organized human experience from its very beginning it is the division between persons and things. No other principle is so rooted in our perception and in our moral conscience as the conviction that we are not things – because things are the opposite of persons.”\(^\text{15}\)

Things were separated from reality as soon as they were rooted in a transcendent idea, as Plato did, or transformed into an immanent foundation by Aristotle. In both cases, rather than operating in a secular environment, things are alienated from reality, resulting in the Cartesian dichotomy between res cogitans and rex extensa. This is the commodified origin of a post-human dimension. “Today, cultural parameters for defining humanity are increasingly intangible and elusive. The human experience is almost endlessly mediated by the pervasive influence of ever-evolving, ever-escalating technological ideologies.”\(^\text{16}\)

Post-humanity has been misunderstood by some who think that the word
Mauro Pala

designates *Star Wars* bizarre fauna or Manga monsters, but it is nothing of the sort. In cinematic classics, post-human is the soft voice of Hal during his rebellion as a thing in Kubrick’s *2001 A Space Odyssey*. But post-human is also *Do Android Dream of Electric Sheep* when android bounty killer Deckard looks at the empty screen of his TV set and ponders: “As he stood by the inert TV set he experienced the silence as visible, and, in its own way, alive. Alive! He had often felt its austere approach before; when it came it burst in without subtlety, evidently unable to wait. The silence of the world could not rein back its greed. Not any longer. Not when it has virtually won. He wondered, then, if the others who had remained on Earth, experienced the void this way”.

The TV set acts, the silence becomes almost tangible. Yeats’ posthumous composition opens the posthumous novel *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* Both elements qualify Dick’s style. He is writing a eulogy, as Yeats did in *Sailing to Byzantium*, he is not writing a eulogy for someone in particular, but for the world order, as generations of American writers raised in the language of the Bible did, from Eliot to Steinbeck up to Cormac McCarthy, exposing a center that cannot hold, as the distinction made by Gaius does not hold either. Dick is looking for a way to fix the system: his is more a cure than a declaration or a strong statement. A remedy, *un remède*.

As the silence of Deckard’s television shows, technology promises the illusion of a social network that it forestalls, but in fact it ruptures the social collective: machines have not only infiltrated the human collective, but have also become an integral part of the establishment – an ineradicable element of human day-to-day existence. Technology thus drastically compromises an insulated human community in two ways: it separates the individual from human contact; but more significantly, it makes her dependent upon – addicted to – the life of the machine. Hooked up to her empty box, entranced by the simulation of the television screen, the human has already, in fact, become the posthuman. But by enunciating and publicizing an ethic of empathy, the political order conceals this dependence on the mechanical; it maintains the fallacy of a cohesive fraternity of autonomous human subjects.

The remedy is anthropological and regards things, not humans. Esposito mentions societies in which people and things form part of the same horizon, where things and humans not only interact but complement each other. He even pushes it further, in claiming in certain societies animate things affect destinies, and hence deserve special care.

Returning to Dick’s androids and their use, it is important to stress that both Dick and Esposito try to single out the principles on which communities are founded. When we think about a community, we immediately think of what is common to the members of a group, one that is shared by all. But can a human community welcome those who are not human beings?

Dick’s exploration of the “schizoid android” occurred mostly in three novels: *Simulacra* (1964) *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep* (1968) and *We can Build You*...
(1969). Of the three, according to Katherine Hayles, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep* represents the best explanation of an emerging posthuman culture:

First, the posthuman privileges informational patterns over material instantiation… Second, the posthuman view considers consciousness as an epiphenomenon… Third, the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses [machines] become a continuation process… Fourth…the posthuman view configures human beings so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulations, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals.

In short, humans are also posthuman: Pauline Kael was the first to acknowledge the analogies between Dick’s work and the notion of the posthuman: in an interview shortly after Dick passed away, she observed that the film *Blade Runner*, directed by Ridley Scott and based on *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep* “sets you down in a lopsided maze of a city, with its post-human feeling.” A few months before his premature death Dick himself admitted in an interview that he was more content with the new script for Scott’s movie, since its author had explored the “post-human feeling” that the novel communicates. He also notices that the replicants (or “androids”) in the movie become more and more human, while the protagonist bounty killer Deckard becomes more and more dehumanized. Dick found this process tragic, because it shows that any one of us could be dehumanized: Deckard’s schizoid nature becomes noticeable when he shows less empathy for his fellow human beings than for the android, and especially for the opera singer android Luba Luft (who corresponds to the character of Rachel in *Blade Runner*).

A keen attention to technology is obvious in the movie and Rachel, in this sense, is the object of study. Since she is fully programmed, Rachel is unable to use her words creatively, but her test with the Voigt Kampff – the devise created to test the androids’ emotional reactions and thus identify them – let the *Blade Runner* Deckard investigate the ideology of materialism which is so central to the posthuman worldview. Rachel, whom Deckard considers an exception among androids, actually becomes actually his mirror image. A frightened mirror image, as she asks him:

“How many androids escaped this time?” Rachel inquired. ‘Presently’ he said. ‘Eight. Originally. Two have already been retired, by someone else; not me’. ‘You get how much for each android?’ Rachel asked. Shrugging, he said. ‘It varies’. Rachel said, ‘If you have no test you can administer, then there is no way you can collect your bounty. So if the Voigt Kampff scale has to be abandoned’. ‘A new scale’ Rick said, ‘will replace it’.

And this is precisely where Esposito meets Dick, at the origin of community.
Communitas has two meanings – onus and officium – which concern obligation and office, while the third, donum, is a sort of gift that requires, or even demands, an exchange in return. Once one individual has accepted the munus, he or she is obliged to return the onus, as goods or services. So, for Esposito modernity does not begin with the institution of sovereign power and its theorization by Hobbes, as Foucault argues. Rather, modernity appears precisely when it becomes possible to theorize a relation between the communitarian munus, which the Italian intellectual associates with a Hobbesian state of generalized conflict, and the institution of sovereign power that acts to protect, or immunize the community from the threat of another conflict.

Developing Esposito’s argument, it might be more appropriate to speak of the sovereign who immunizes the community from the community’s own possible excesses: the use of force might be necessary when faced with someone’s desire to acquire another person’s goods. The dystopic character of the story we are dealing with resides precisely in this phase, exemplified in Blade Runner as the fugitive replicants – or androids – led by charismatic Roy Batty claims to possess consciousness and hence deserve to be included in the community and being given a longer lease on life.

With the risk of conflict inscribed at the very heart of the community, since the principle on which it is based lies in the equality between all its members, immunization does not precede or follows the moment of community but appears simultaneously as its “intimate essence”; immunity re-establishes the community’s equality but cannot fully satisfy all the members’ requests. The moment when the immunity aporia of the community is recognized as the strategic problem for the 21st Century constellation of state nations coincides with the impasse of postmodern society: sovereign power is tightly linked to communal self-preservation through self-negation. “The simultaneous presence of development and restraint, opening and closing, positive and negative – typical of the immune paradigm” is represented in exemplary fashion by the apprehensive character of Deckard.

Blade Runner dramatizes this relationship between individuals who depend upon their capacity to receive and let the munus circulate. While The Chronicles of Narnia display a utopic circulation of the munus between all its inhabitants, Blade Runner takes the community’s tension already present in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep to the extreme in the scene in which Roy kills his creator Tyrrell for his ingratitude towards the services Roy has performed during his galactic assignments.

Dick is skeptical about the possibility of an individual emancipation, while Esposito reads immunity as a historical category inextricably linked to modernity. Immunity will be compared to recent attempts to deconstruct and analyze a conceptual language for describing forms of relation which show that not only are we structured by these relations, but we can also lose our control on them.

The Italian theorist stresses the persistence of the negative that prevails in Deckard’s world, where the containment – in the form of (almost) forced migration – connects the language of law with that of theology and advertising. What ties the religious form to the semantic of immunization is the salvific biologic sense with the normative character. As Benjamin
maintained, the conflict is staged between different political possibilities, but it is substantial to the conditions of the choice. In any case, survival depends on obedience and the capability to perform a ritual.

Eventually both Deckard and the rebel androids must obey, in a replica of Lewis’ rule of the conditioners over the conditioned human material:

[they] exist in a similar relation to the dominant social power in society. This relation defines a hidden bond of sympathy and understanding between the hunter and the hunted. During the film, Deckard’s life is twice saved by a replicant, while he, in turn, saves the life of a fifth, a recently created and even more sophisticated replicant, called Rachel, with whom Deckard eventually falls in love. The Los Angeles to which the replicants returns is hardly a utopia. The flexibility of the replicants’ capacity to labor in outer space is [...] matched in Los Angeles by a decrepit landscape of deindustrialization and post-industrial decay [...] the chaos of signs, of competing significations and messages, suggests a condition of fragmentation and uncertainty at street level that emphasizes many of those facets of postmodern aesthetics [as] fusion of levels, discontinuous signifiers, explosion of boundaries and erosion. Yet there is also an overwhelming sense of some hidden organizing power [...] The chaos is tolerated precisely because it seems so unthreatening to overall control27.

David Harvey’s brilliant diagnosis of *Blade Runner’s* metropolitan movie landscape takes us, with its reference to inconspicuous powerful agencies, to the notion of biopolitics as conceived by Esposito.

For Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Lévinas, Nazi totalitarianism collapsed spiritual and existential categories into biopolitics. Nazism is what Esposito considers an example of autoimmunity, through which an ethnic group can be preserved only with the annihilation of another race. He abhors this line of reasoning exactly as Arendt does, but he conceives a totally different form of biopolitics, a remedy to one of the major problems of our time, the “barrier between language and politics: politics escapes language; language no longer has words for politics. This political aphasia not only is representative of our historical situation but in fact concerns all of modern political philosophy and its constitutively metaphysical character. Esposito goes on to observe that the metaphysical element of modern political philosophy lies primarily in leveling the complexity of sense horizons of concepts of political philosophy.”28

Esposito distrusts a univocal and self-enclosed analysis, rediscovering the Heraclitean idea of the coincidence of opposites; this move belies the predictability of the philosophy of history and similar deterministic paradigms. Such kind of knowledge is adopted by Deckard, when he, after the encounter with Rachel, explicitly controverts the creed of the android-hunting policeman [declaring that]: ‘the electric things have their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are’. Thus he describes the situation that an interaction with the mechanical landscape [...] is indeed a vital part of the planetary environment. To
have overlooked this reality has meant denying the basic entre-deux between self and the world – an denying, specifically, the established presence of diverse machines, ones materially intertwined into the lives of the novel’s characters.

Gill Galvan observes that several of Dick’s novels feature characters who initially accept the dominant ideology to discover through their own experience that these ideas are false and that there’s a possible coexistence beyond the usual empirical reality. For Esposito this is the final step from anthropology to politics, the moment in which the anthropological urge to order in a Hobbesian sense can be overcome. Contrary to the closeness of the common life he detects in his dystopic world, Dick’s alter ego Deckard discovers “strategies which to in the direction of distancing, of a functional separation, which primarily involves the reciprocal relationship between individuals, but then […] also the relationship each individual entertains with himself or herself. […] human beings can protect their identity only by splitting themselves into the polarity between inner and outer, private and public, invisible and visible, and by arranging for each pole to safeguard the other”.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Notes

7. “In a giant, empty, decaying building which had once housed thousands, a single TV set hawked its wares to an uninhabited room. Their ownerless ruin had, before World War Terminus, been tended and maintained. Here had been the suburbs of San Francisco, a short ride by monorail rapid transit; the entire peninsula had chattered like a bird tree with life and opinions and complaints, and now the watchful owners had either died or migrated to a colony world. Mostly the former. It had been a costly war despite the valiant predictions of the Pentagon and its smug scientific vassal, the Rand Corporation – which had, in fact, existed not far from this spot. Like the apartment owners, the corporation had departed, evidently for good. No one missed it. In addition, no one today remembered why the war had come about or, who, if anyone, had won. The dust which had contaminated most of the planet’s surface had originated in no country and no one, not even the wartime enemy, had planned on it. First, strangely, the owls had died. At the time it has seemed almost funny, the fat, fluffy white birds lying here and there, in yards and on streets; coming out no earlier than twilight as they had while alive the owls escaped notice. Medieval plagues had manifested themselves in a similar way, in the form of many dead rats. This plague, however, had descended from above”. Philip Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, London, Orion Books, 2016 (1968), p. 11.
9. “Our environment, and I mean our man-made world of machines, artificial constructs, computers, electronic systems, interlinking homeostatic components – all of this is in fact beginning more and more to possess what the earnest psychologists fear the primitive sees in his environment: animation. In a very real sense our environment is becoming alive, or at least quasi-alive, and in ways specifically and fundamentally analogous to ourselves”. Philip Dick, “The Android and the Human”, in Lawrence Satin (ed.), op. cit., p.183.


15. *Ibidem*.


23. Rachel’s android character dwindles between the “‘dark haired girl’ (the emotionally warm female whose archetype is Dick’s dead twin sister) and the ‘schizoid woman’ (the stolid and unfeeling female, modeled after the author’s affectively detached mother) Hayles identifies Rachel as a character oddly split between these two alternatives” in Jill Galvan, *op. cit.*, p. 428.


26. “Under UN law each emigrant automatically received possession of an android subtype of his choice, and, by 1990, the variety of subtypes passed all understanding, in the manner of American automobiles of the 1960s. That had been the ultimate incentive of emigration: the android servant as carrot, the radioactive fallout as stick. The UN had made it easy to emigrate, difficult if not impossible to stay”. Philip Dick, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, p. 12.


