Andrew Lee Bridges

Utopian Freedom and Value Portrayed in Hegel’s Comic Consciousness and Fictional Behaviorism

Abstract: In this paper I explore the conceptual relatability of Hegel’s description of the Comic Consciousness found in the chapter on “Religion” in his Phenomenology of Spirit to Skinner’s portrayal of a behavioral scientist being tantamount to God, particularly in the fictional behavioral scientist’s ability to create freedom and value in Walden Two. I examine how the Self-Consciousness of the fictional behavioral scientist and the self-consciousness of the Comic Consciousness appear to embody a form of freedom that is able to transcend and create the values of their respective communities. I suggest similarities between these two shapes of self-consciousness and forms of freedom, as well as the disparities between them, express difficulties for understanding freedom and value in the conceptual context of both the idea of utopia and the “death of God.”

Keywords: Hegel’s Comic Consciousness; Fictional Behaviorism; Walden Two; Utopia; Freedom.

Andrew Lee Bridges
California State University, United States
abridges@fullerton.edu

DOI: 10.24193/cechinox.2024.46.10

In this paper I treat both the idea of the Comic Consciousness and the idea of Fictional Behavioral Scientist as conceptual ideas that allow for robust thought-experiments; thought-experiments that help us to understand what ideas of freedom and value might mean. I remain agnostic to the philosophical positions that make the concept of the Comic Consciousness or of Fictional Behaviorism internally coherent – philosophical positions such as determinism and absolute idealism, respectively. I begin by sharing what I find is the greatest similarity between the Comic Consciousness and the Fictional Behavioral Scientist. Both forms of Self-Consciousness experience a freedom from the ideas and laws that structure the reality they are a part of. These Self-Consciousnesses are not subject to the laws of their respective universes.

Walden Two is a persuasive novel written by B. F. Skinner, in 1945, in which he aimed to show that a properly implemented effective science of behavior is a panacea able to engender a utopian community. Skinner happened to write this novel exactly one hundred years after...
Thoreau wrote *Walden*, and Skinner takes much of Thoreau’s work as inspiration for his own novel. In *Walden Two*, six individuals, two professors and four students, visit a utopian community bearing the name “Walden Two,” and they investigate the community to decide whether it is in fact utopian. The novel, for the most part, is a series of discussions that the visitors have with the community’s founder, T. E. Frazier, who is a behavioral scientist. In Skinner’s *Walden Two*, the fictional behavioral scientist, Frazier, acknowledges the premise of determinism, which grounds the science of behavior, and uses this science to render the greatest good within the community. The creation of the intentional community on the part of the behavioral scientist is presented as a free act done out of love and altruism. Which is to say, the actions of the fictional behavioral scientist do not appear subject to the laws to determinism when the fictional behavioral scientists in utilizing his science of behavior. The control which the fictional behavioral scientist subtly uses, Skinner portrays in the novel *Walden Two* as being tantamount to the divine and even superior to some descriptions of God. This portrayal conceptually serves to illustrate that the fictional behavioral scientist transcends the community he creates, and is not subject to the metaphysical law of determinism which allows him to create the fictional intentional community.

In the Comic Consciousness, which is the last shape of self-consciousness experienced through the Greek Religion as a form of art – and in particular the form of poetry known as comedy – the realization occurs by the people who share this form of Self-Consciousness that they are the creators of their Gods and of all the concepts related to their divinities, such as oracles, divination, and Fate. Fate, which was portrayed in Hegel’s presentation of Greek tragedy as inescapable and as the determiner of one’s destiny, is now revealed to be a human creation. In their freedom and artistic expression, the Greek Religion as a form of art, created a concept, which appears, at least ostensibly to undermine the very concept of freedom. The Comic Consciousness, now realizing itself to be the creator of these concepts is finally able to create whatever divinities, values, or laws it wishes. Through this realization it transcends the limitations earlier forms of self-consciousness had which saw fate as an inescapable absolute.

The Fictional Behavioral Scientist paradoxically argues that one can be the freest, once they realize that freedom, in a metaphysical sense of having a will that is free, is illusory. If the individual believes they are free and attempts to avoid external control, they will only encounter varieties of other forms of control. Similarly, in Hegel’s portrayal of the Greek Self-consciousness related to tragedy, attempting to learn one’s fate or avoid one’s fate will make one’s fate no less inescapable. It is only when realizing that one can respectively be the creator of the science that controls behavior or the creator of the concept of Fate that determines one’s life that each form of Self-Consciousness is no longer controlled by the coherent metaphysical assumptions that structure the reality they are a part of. No longer being controlled by the assumptions that structure their reality, each Self-Consciousness is free to transcend it.
The Greatest Difference Between the Two Forms of Self-Consciousness

What I find to be the most significant difference between the presentations of the two forms of Self-Consciousnesses is their focus on either the individual or the community. Skinner’s fictional behavioral scientist is presented as tantamount to God and as having the characteristics often attributed to concepts of the divine, such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence—characteristics which appear to be contained within the sphere of the intentional community. The Fictional Behavioral Scientist uses these qualities to foster human welfare and reduce human suffering. The utilitarian values of the greatest good for the greatest number have not changed in this form of Self-Consciousness. What has changed instead is the virtuous nature of the Fictional Behavioral Scientist, who, being in a God-like position of control of a community, is motivated out of love and altruism. The Fictional Behavioral Scientist remains detached to any concept, practice, or institutions they find to be an impediment to collective human welfare. In his preface “Walden Two Revisited,” Skinner also appears perfectly willing to part ways with money, capitalism, the nuclear family, and living in cities.

The supposed references, when elaborating on the Comic Consciousness, by contrast, appear more focused on the individual and their particular aims—even to the detriment of the community. Hegel scholars, such as H. S. Harris, have suggested that Hegel when exploring aspects of the Comic Consciousness makes reference to Aristophanes’ comedy Clouds. For example Harris, when interpreting Hegel’s thoughts regarding the Comic Consciousness in a passage in paragraph 746 of the Phenomenology, explains, “Rational thinking destroys the conventional piety of the Chorus. The Gods return to their natural aspect. They are the Clouds [of Aristophanes], the simple thoughts of values in philosophy. The sophists corrupt the youth and the wisdom of experience is a joke.” Furthermore, when reflecting on precisely how Hegel understands the Comic Consciousness to grasp its own creation of the Gods it experiences, Harris writes, “The poet, the actors and the audience are not philosophers. They are all ordinary folk, who have recognized themselves as world-creators, and as the creators of the Gods. In this perspective, Comedy is the moment of perfect self-consciousness of what Art is.” I would like to suggest that aspects of the Comic Consciousness can be exemplified by Strepsiades the protagonist of the play and particularly by his attitudes and actions toward the beginning of the play. The audience can observe that Strepsiades maintains a happy demeanor toward his comic and perhaps nihilistic approach to solving his financial problems. In this form of Self-Consciousness, the focus in on the individual’s freedom at the expense of everyone else in the community. Both forms of Self-Consciousness display the maximum amount of freedom their coherent metaphysical views allow them too. The former exemplifies the maximum amount of freedom available to a community given determinism, the latter demonstrates the maximum amount of freedom available to the individual given limitless creativity in the form of Art.
Understanding the Death of God in Both Forms of Self-Consciousness

Both shapes of Self-Consciousness are described either implicitly or explicitly in relation to the notion of the “death of God.” In both works the “death of God,” is vividly illustrated and its illustration is related to freedom and phenomenological experience. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel refers to the realization of the Comic Consciousness as being tantamount to the realization that quote, “God is Dead.” Hegel explains,

We see that this Unhappy Consciousness constitutes the counterpart and the completion of the comic consciousness that is perfectly happy within itself. Into the latter, all divine being returns, or it is the complete alienation of substance. The Unhappy Consciousness, on the other hand, is conversely, the tragic fate of the certainty of self that aims to be absolute. It is the consciousness of the loss of all essential being in this certainty of itself… the loss of substance as well as of the Self it is the grief which expresses itself in the hard saying that ‘God is dead’.10

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel find that the Unhappy Consciousness and the Comic Consciousness are different aspects of the same shape of Self-Consciousness. This difference between these two Self-Consciousnesses is psychological as opposed to ontological. The Unhappy Consciousness experiences the grief of the ‘death of God’; whereas the Comic Consciousness experiences the freedom and the creativity of creating its own values and Gods.

This dual aspect of the Comic Consciousness and Unhappy Consciousness can be observed in Aristophanes’ comedy *Clouds*. The flux or oscillation between the dual aspect of this Self-Consciousness in the character Strepsiades can also be observed. Strepsiades’ actions and attitudes in the beginning of the play exemplify the Comic Consciousness, whereas Strepsiades’ attitudes and actions toward the end of the play exemplify the Unhappy Consciousness. It is not the case that Strepsiades situation is a happy situation, but rather, the audience is able to observe that Strepsiades maintains a happy demeanor toward his comic and perhaps nihilistic approach to resolving his problematic financial situation. Strepsiades is perfectly happy attempting to use law and reason to aid him in evading his debts and in breaking the promises he made to repay them. Law and reason (Bad Reason) from Strepsiades' perspective are there for him to use to better his situation – and this perhaps is all they are there for in his mind. Law and reason do not exist for him to seek truth, or virtue, or a common good for society, or any such similar endeavor we might call justice. Law and reason exist for Strepsiades to serve his goals and to make life more pleasing to him. In his endeavor to utilize law and reason in this way, he remains cheerful and happy. He does not experience any moral conflicts, nor does he experience any moral pause or struggle over the rightness of his action. Strepsiades simply and happily ventures out to use reason and law to his utmost advantage despite the consequences to anyone else. Strepsiades’ behavior, I suggest, implies a realization that humans created the gods and therefore, the ethics, laws and reason associated with them, and
that they did so for the benefit of humans. Strepsiades’ actions are simply an unapologetic acting out of such a realization. His unapologetic stance is a way of implicitly saying that he “is perfectly happy within itself [himself].”\footnote{11}

Toward the end of the play, however, Strepsiades’ plan unravels when his son, Phidippides becomes a better reasoner/arguer than his father and begins to utilize reason in a way that is against his father. This event alienates Strepsiades from the reason he so happily embraced during the beginning of the play. Phidippides who is supposed to be learning reason, argument, and rhetoric to be of service to his father and to essentially do his father’s will (and in this sense they are supposed to be of the same mind), now breaks away from the will of his father and takes their reason with him. Strepsiades is left alienated from the reason that his son now possesses, and he is left further alienated from the world in which this reason brings into being – a world in which it is now ethical for a son to beat his father. Strepsiades begins to protest that it is not right for a son to beat his father, but this ethical claim now lacks all substance. Strepsiades experiences grief from his ethical claim lacking any substance and he experiences alienation from reason – this is how I suggest that Strepsiades oscillates to exemplify and inhabit the Unhappy Consciousness in his experiences portrayed in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*. In these examples we can see that the shift in perspectives from Comic Consciousness to Unhappy Consciousness is rather arbitrary and is essentially based on his fortunate or unfortunate circumstances. In the experience of the Unhappy Consciousness, Hegel explains that the grief of that is tantamount to the ‘death of God’\footnote{12} is felt.

Finally, Hegel describes the phenomenological experience of the ‘death of God’ by the Unhappy Consciousness and the Comic Consciousness as they realize that they have created their Gods and their concept of Fate:

In the conditions of right or law, then, the ethical world and the religion of that are submerged and lost in the comic consciousness, and the Unhappy Consciousness is the knowledge of this *total loss*. It has lost both the worth attached to its personality as mediated, as *thought*. Trust in the eternal laws of the gods has vanished, and the Oracles, which pronounced on particular questions, are dumb. The statues are now only stones from which the living soul has flown, just as the hymns are words from which belief has gone. The tables of the gods provide no spiritual food and drink, and in his games and festivals man no longer recovers the joyful consciousness of his unity with the divine. The works of the Muse now lacks the power of the Spirit, for the Spirit has gained its certainty of itself from the crushing of gods and men.\footnote{13}

Hegel is concerned not only with providing his reader with the dialectical account of Spirit’s experience of the death of God, which it arrives at through the Greek Religion in the Self-Consciousness of the Comic Consciousness and the Unhappy-Consciousness. Hegel is also interested in conveying to the reader what he finds the necessary corresponding phenomenological experience of phenomena formerly understood to be divine which
now becomes empty of divinity in this form of Self-Consciousness. The Understanding informs perception, and in their understanding of their complete freedom, the Greeks apprehend that they phenomenologically superimposed the experience of divinity onto nature and ritualistic practice. This form of Self-Consciousness realizes that all its experiences of meaning, of value, of fate and of fortune were contained in the power of its collective imagination. They realize that through their collective imagination they are able to create any value, and perhaps, any corresponding phenomenological experience.

Hegel presents the ancient Greeks’ phenomenological experience as a “total loss” of the presence of the divine, or as a presence of an absence of what was. What we find in the Comic Consciousness is the positive side of such absence or emptiness. This total loss creates for the Comic Consciousness the requisite ontological space for the realization of human freedom. This realization is not only experienced intellectually through the Understanding; it is experienced phenomenologically as well via perception. I argue that a similar phenomenological experience occurs within the characters’ Self-Consciousness in the novel WALDEN TWO.

In WALDEN TWO, the Death of God is explored in the idea of the Fictional Behavioral Scientist being showcased as superior to the divine, and in the realization that the human being can have complete control over another human being if the former possesses an effective science of behavior. This is presented most succinctly in two passages in WALDEN TWO. Concerning the realization in the novel that the behavioral scientist has come to take the place of God and is presented as superior to commonly held notions of divinity, I offer the following passage in which a philosophical exchange occurs in the dialogue between the fictional founder of the community of WALDEN TWO, T. E. Frazier and a philosopher who is critical of his project named Castle. After Castle accuses Frazier of being a dictator of the intentional community Frazier explains, “No more than God. Or rather less so. Generally, I’ve let things alone. I’ve never stepped in to wipe out the evil works of men with a great flood. Nor have I sent a personal emissary to reveal my plan and to put my people back on the track. The original design took deviations into account and provided automatic corrections. It’s rather an improvement upon Genesis.” By “an improvement upon Genesis” Frazier is not only making a value judgment concerning the quality of the design, but he is also making a value judgment concerning the qualities of the designer. Frazier views divine intervention on the part of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament God as ultimately a lack of foresight and planning.

Further comparison between Frazier and God continues when Frazier is accused by Burris (a former colleague of his) of having a God complex. To this description Frazier replies, “Of course I’m not indifferent to power!... And I like to play God! Who wouldn’t, under the circumstances? After all, man, even Jesus Christ thought he was God!” Burris, the novel’s narrator and Frazier’s former colleague, describes his reaction to Frazier’s statement. Burris’s description further serves as a comparison between Frazier and concepts of Divinity – or in this particular case, as an association of concepts of divinity with Frazier.
Burris’s description is as follows, “He [Frazier] started at me in silence, as if to see whether I had caught the full significance of his remark. He was not challenging me, and there was no hint of blasphemy. His tone had been almost devout. He spoke as if Jesus were an honored colleague whose technical discoveries he held in the highest esteem.”

Toward the end of the novel Frazier is increasingly compared to a god, and he explicitly compares himself to both the God of the Hebrew Bible and to Jesus Christ. Furthermore, Frazier even appears to believe that mastering an effective science of behavior has made him superior to certain theistic concepts of God. Although Frazier professes a belief in determinism, he definitely holds himself in high enough esteem to believe he may somehow transcend this determinism. Frazier also professes to have a quality of love for the people of Walden Two; this quality of love, Frazier qualifies and compares with divine love. This comparison Frazier explains to Burris when he says, “There’s another point of similarity…These are my children…I love them…What is love…except another name for the use of positive reinforcement?”

The latter way in which the “death of God” is illustrated in the novel Walden Two is through the amount of control one individual is able to exert over another. This control is utilized for the benefit of the individual, and the behavioral scientist is portrayed as having altruistic motives; however, the thoroughness and ubiquity of the control appears comparable to the control an omnipotent being would have. This distinction between the individual controlling the masses and the mass of individuals being controlled is succinctly expressed by Frazier when he explains, “When we ask what Man can make of Man, we don’t mean the same thing by ‘Man’ in both instances. We mean to ask what a few men can make of mankind. And that’s the all-absorbing question of the twentieth century. What kind of world can we build – those of us who understand the science of behavior?”

Frazier understands the science of behavior to be a panacea able to solve essentially all of society’s problems because he finds that essentially all of society’s problems are reducible to problems of human behavior. In this fictional portrayal of behavioral science Frazier is able to design a utopian community because he has honed a science of behavior and because this science of behavior’s effectiveness, Frazier finds the absence of freedom a cogent description of the human condition. According to Frazier, human beings are neither capricious nor free. This is why a science of behavior can work and this is why human beings can ultimately be manipulated to their own benefit.

One of the paramount dialogues in the novel is on the existence of freedom, and this dialogue occurs between one of the visitors, a philosophy professor named Castle, and the community’s founder, T. E. Frazier. During this conversation Frazier asks Castle a question, but before he asks it, Frazier warns Castle that this question will be “…the most terrifying question of your life.” The question Frazier asks Castle is, “What would you do if you found yourself in possession of an effective science of behavior?” After a few moments of pondering, and without feeling any terror, Castle replies, “I think I would dump your science of behavior in the ocean.”
Frazier has a quite different answer to this question, and responds that he would “… take up and wield the science of behavior for the good of mankind…” 22 Both Frazier and Castle provide responses to this question that they feel would be of greatest benefit to humanity, but both answers differ radically because each has a different conception of what freedom is. 23 During this conversation Frazier both denies that freedom exists, while at the same time claiming that Walden Two is the “freest place on earth.” 24 This ostensible contradiction is actually a belief in the Philosophical position of Compatibilism. 25 Frazier does not believe humans have the ability to do otherwise because he believes determinism is true, but he also believes humans have the ability to do as they please within the community of Walden Two, and this ability to do as one pleases is understood to be freedom for Frazier. Castle, on the other hand, holds a Libertarian view of freedom, and therefore believes humans have the genuine ability to do otherwise, but that an effective science of behavior robs us of that ability, and so it must be disposed of. Castle sees Frazier as a dictator who has total control over every human in the utopian community, Walden Two. Castle sees Frazier as robbing these human beings of their freedom.

Lastly, much like in Hegel’s description of the Comic Consciousness and the Unhappy Consciousness, the characters in the novel Walden Two begin to see the fictional behavioral scientist as having characteristic of the divine, phenomenologically. Castle, Frazier’s main critic, only ever experiences Frazier as blasphemous or as a dictator. Burris, however, who is more open to the possibility that Frazier has made correct assumptions about the human condition and, therefore has made a utopian community which corresponds to the human condition, begins to phenomenologically associate Frazier with the divine. Burris explains this phenomenological association when he says, “He [Frazier] was lying flat on his back, his arms stretched out at full length. His legs were straight but his ankles were lightly crossed. He allowed his head to fall limply to one side, and I reflected that his beard made him look a little like Christ. Then, with a shock, I saw that he had assumed the position of crucifixion.” 26 In this passage, which leads to the aforementioned series of comparison between the Fictional Behavioral Scientist and concepts and representations of the divine, Burris begins to phenomenologically associate Frazier with divinity. Burris, then argues with such a comparison and argues with Frazier for the remainder of the chapter (Ch. 33) and he argue through much of the remainder of the book, until he eventually decides to become a member of Walden Two.

A Brief Coda on The Comic Consciousness and the Concluding Paragraph of Walden/Walden Two

Prior to Burris deciding to become a member of Walden Two (in the novel Walden Two) he purchases a copy of Thoreau’s Walden, in a train station. As he is returning on foot to Walden Two, Burris reads the last paragraph of Walden. This paragraph consequently becomes both the last paragraph of the second to last chapter (Ch. 35) of Skinner’s work Walden Two as well as Thoreau’s Walden. The paragraph is as follows: “I do not say that John or
Jonathan will realize all this; but such is the character of that morrow which mere lapse of time can never make dawn. The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us. Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning-star.”27 This poetic expression of Thoreau’s serves to indicate that what keeps humanity from collectively experiencing a qualitatively different type of reality – both intellectually and phenomenologically is the limitations we place on our intersubjective imaginations as societies. In this paper, I aimed to show that both the Comic Consciousness and the Self-Consciousness of the Fictional Behavioral Scientist were able to transcend the limitations of the truths that coherently structured their reality and structure the imaginations of the members of society they remain a part of. The experience of these forms of Self-Consciousness involved realizing their own authorship of their freedom and value. This freedom was poetically expressed in the phrase “God is Dead” in reference to the Comic Consciousness and Unhappy Consciousness. It was phenomenologically experienced by both the Comic Consciousness and the Self-Consciousness of the Fictional Behavioral Scientist. Such freedom suggests, to utilize Thoreau’s poetic language, that humans can collectively decide to awaken into whatever quality of morning we freely realize.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


NOTES

1. In Walden Two, the fictional behavioral scientist explains to one of the fictional critics, who is a philosopher named Castle, “I deny that freedom exists at all. I must deny it—or my program would be absurd. You can’t have a science about a subject matter which hops capriciously about. Perhaps we can never prove that man isn’t free; it’s an assumption. But the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more and more plausible.” Skinner, B. F. Walden Two. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., USA, 1948. p. 242
2. Here the fictional behavior scientist specifies that love is actually another name for positive reinforcement (refer to p. 282 of the text *Walden Two*).

3. Here the fictional founder of Walden Two explains this point, saying, “But you would only be leaving the control in other hands...The charlatan, the demagogue, the salesman, the ward heeler, the bully, the cheat, the educator, the priest—all who are now in possession of the techniques of behavioral engineering.” Skinner, B. F. *Walden Two*. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., USA, 1948, p. 24


9. In the German edition of the *Phenomenology*, there is also a reference to Aristophanes play Clouds and to the character of Strepsiades. Refer to: G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988, p. 615.


23. For a more extensive analysis of this conversation between Castle and Frazier, please refer to the article “Alain Badiou Visits Walden Two,” found in *Badiou Studies* vol. 4.1, New York, Punctum Books, 2015, p. 25-46.


25. For a fuller account of the philosophical position of compatibilism, refer to Daniel C. Dennett’s work *Freedom Evolves*. In his work *Freedom Evolves*, Daniel C. Dennett argues a compatibilist view asserting that freedom would not be possible without determinism. In this work he writes “So deterministic worlds can quite comfortably support possibilities of the broader, more interesting variety. Indeed, introducing indeterminism adds nothing in the way of worthwhile possibilities, opportunities, or competences to a universe. Dennett, Daniel, C. *Freedom Evolves*, New York, Viking Publishing, 2003, p. 82-83.
