Mara Mărginean

“G. Bariţiu” Institute of History, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

maramarginean@yahoo.com

 

 

Importing Words to Build a City:

The Socialist Modernization of Hunedoara

between the Architects’ Designs and the Politicians’ Projects, 1949-1952

 

 

Abstract: This paper examines the shifting borders of institutional functioning in the trans-nationalization of public space, which had to redefine the collective identities of the newly formed socialist communities, by looking at how the built environment in Hunedoara was the outcome of negotiated agreements between architects and politicians. Given the Romanian authorities’ isomorphic institutional behavior, according to which implementing a Soviet bureaucratic order in a different socio-economic context had to legitimate the system politically, while not to fluidizing the decision-making mechanisms, carrying out the program became the illustration of versatile practices and conflicting creation choices. As such, the built environment’s ideological reading was added various new facets, while the meaning was revisited every time the political context changed.

Keywords: Romania; Socialist realism; Urban architecture; Ideology; Bureaucracy.

 

 

It is well known that socialist regimes based their modernizing strategies on command economy and centralized bureaucratic decision-making mechanisms. In so doing, they constructed a political system of state-management that consisted of strict control over financial and material resources and finely-structured institutional networks. This had two effects. On one hand, the authorities in charge were caught between political priorities, economic facets, and bureaucratic interactions, which did not happen always as planned, making the system fluid and, sometimes, even hard to predict. On the other hand, the population negotiated its identity by eluding the ideological cannons through particular interpretations and adaptations. Inside this hybrid system, therefore, various actors nuanced a theoretically compelling project by performing multiple, but parallel understandings of the communist modernization initiative. For instance, the Romanian city Hunedoara, which rapidly expanded soon after the end of WWII due to the communist project of industrial development, illustrates how the centralized institutional involvement and the clear-cut building program were blurred by local interactions, legislative interpretations, and creative adaptations in design. Despite the fact that the ‘modern’ aspect was an outcome of the steady concern for rationalization and standardization, scientific planning and economic preeminence fueling the politicians’ projects and the architects’ views, the ambivalence in decisional process opened up a different perspective on the city. As such, the final form of Hunedoara was a mélange of architectural styles and functions kept together by propagandistic constructs, which illustrated a difference between what was stated and what was really done. This dissociation opens up several questions. To what extent were the official cannons of state-leadership and ideological frameworks efficient in bringing to life the so-called modernization program? How im/penetrable were concepts like rationalization, standardization, and bureaucratization under the radicalized conditions of the early Cold War years, and what, if anything, made them alter their initial significance? Which were the rapports between the planning structures and the political decision-making factors?

This essay will examine the shifting borders of institutional functioning in the trans-nationalization of public space, which had to redefine the collective identities of the newly formed socialist communities, by looking at how in Hunedoara the built environment was the outcome of negotiated agreements between architects and politicians. Given the Romanian authorities’ isomorphic institutional behavior, as defined by Powdell and DiMaggio, according to which implementing a Soviet bureaucratic order in a different socio-economic context had to legitimate politically the system, but not to fluidize the decision-making mechanisms, carrying out the program became the illustration of versatile practices and conflicting creation choices.[1] As such, the built environment’s ideological reading was inflicted with various facets, while its meaning was revisited every time the political context changed.

 

The City, Borders and Economic Space: Setting Up the Questions

 

By the end of the Second World War, Andrei Zhdanov, Central Committee Secretary, Politburo member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Stalin’s spokesperson in the cultural field, launched the ‘two champs theory’ that divided the world into two: “imperialist and anti-democratic” and “anti-imperialist and democratic.”[2] Moreover, phrases and dogmatic constructs like anti-cosmopolitism, bourgeois imperialism, nationalism, proud patriotism, etc., with all their intended meaning were used on a regular basis both in the Soviet Union and in the eastern bloc. The campaign started soon afterwards, known as the Zhdanovshchina after its initiator, was tantamount to a crackdown on the arts, which effected into an “ideological and aesthetic polarization between the West and the USSR [that] produced an artistic antagonism that was certainly more visible than in other disciplines.”[3] For the Soviets, however, the rhetoric unbounded then comprised a more complicated state of affairs. Given that the tensed political arrangement between the former Allies had evolved into an open confrontation, they started a peace campaign that officially aimed to bring science and technology in the service of the people, and furthermore, claimed that the previous understanding of modernity was redundant in the post-war conditions of socialism.

Under the general reading, modernization was the outcome of combined actions of socio-economic transformations and ideological paths. While the former – industrialization, urbanization, and mass-education – consisted of state-led measures of structural reconversions with direct consequences upon the population’s living standards, the latter – the technologization of the state and the individual – delineated the symbolic mechanisms of social mobilization, as well as their foreseen outcomes. In so doing, the decision-makers sought to develop a better future. At the core of the process there was placed a new concept of social life, according to which society was to be urban, predictable and rationalized by economic projections. In general, the success of the program would be guaranteed by a well-planned functionalist organization of space, steady political investment, and rational resource management. As the state was dependent on cost-effective strategies, the modernization process, consisting of acquired control over “territory, communication and speed,”[4] escaped the domain of architectural influence in favor of engineering. Technicality, therefore, and not the apparent side of the material world, would maintain a strong cohesion at the institutional level and would also support the process by both “right-sizing the state” and “right-peopling” the masses.[5]

The Soviets had argued that, as modernization constantly depreciated the national identity based on the trans-national circulation of concepts, knowledge, and resources, this vision of state-functionalism was no longer sufficient to support the masses’ needs. Such disagreements occurred because, unlike the capitalist economic system based on competition/trans-national and efficiency principles, the Soviet one was fueled by the Leninist concept of international socialism, which stated that socialist states had to attain their economic independence by developing a heavy industry. Technology continued to play a significant part in raising the peace discourse. By then, science had acquired its revolutionary-democratic content, and soon after 1945, it was cast, alongside with economy and culture, as the major ideological benchmark of the Soviet-type modernity.[6] At the level of official rhetoric, ‘culture’ replaced ‘communication’ as the domain of modernization, while the notions of ‘territory’ and ‘speed’ were re-defined, given the principles of international proletariat. Accordingly, based on the Marxist understanding of progress as the succession of economic stages of development, the vision of segregated nationalism would be replaced with that of trans-national class unity, which effected, at least ideologically, into the dissolution of borders, both symbolic and geographic. Within the multiethnic Soviet state, the translation from “attributed” group/ethnic identity to “obtained” class identity would be achieved by each nation on a case-to-case basis, by having the masses reading critically the so-called progressive historical periods. This conversion was expressed through the dictum “national in form and socialist in content.”[7] As such, the centrality of rationality and technology was based on artistic representations in the Soviets’ attempts of renegotiating borders of knowledge and social change.

The use of socialist realism, as opposed to abstractness, was symptomatic for the state’s attempt to assemble a mass culture through centralized-led strategies of enlightening mobilization. The best way of grounding the socialist consciousness into accurate representations of the surrounding material world was to select, from the wide range of artistic representations, those elements that were the closest to the people’s values, namely, those emblematic for the progressive historical periods, and also, for the genuine folk tradition.

 

Spelling the Program: Anti-Cosmopolitism and the Political Project in Building Hunedoara.

 

In Romania by the late 1940s and the early 1950s, given the increasing Soviet pressure and the institutional reconfiguration by founding the Popular Councils and setting up a new administrative organization, the decision-makers were forced to reevaluate the development strategies so that a different pattern of architectural representation could be found, and a new line of bureaucratic interaction could be created.[8] Echoing the theoretical statements on anti-cosmopolitism, bourgeois nationalism and imperialism expressed first by Leonte Rautu, and then in architectural critique by Nicolae Badescu, reading the design in Hunedoara immediately after 1949 was realized in terms of economic efficiency and ideological truthfulness.[9] On one hand, due to the heavy industry priority constantly reaffirmed by the regime, the increasing efficiency in steel production took over any social initiative. On the other hand, the subsequent attempts to establish development frameworks so as to delineate the best socialist living model comprised within the command economy both the bureaucratic and the architectural mechanisms of city planning. This came as a result of the fact that, during the initial building campaign led between 1947 and 1948, less than a hundred buildings were erected out of more than a thousand planned, while in 1949, the accommodation capacity of Hunedoara did not exceed 8,000 inhabitants.

Already by the end of 1947, the Romanian officials contacted the local authorities in Hunedoara to start the research for drawing up the systematization plan. Using the monographic research methodology, the program, focusing on the region as a whole and not strictly on the urban area of Hunedoara, engaged an interdisciplinary team consisting of architects, physicians, economists, sociologists and ethnographers. Their aim was to sketch the socio-demographic character of the region in order to delineate “the concerted action of factors like territory, population and production that would lead towards an economic system.”[10] Announced as a pioneering drive in post-war Romania, the research focused on social and demographic details and had to identify solutions to facilitate a shift in the regional structure from an agrarian-based to an industrialized economy. Much of the preliminary data, gathered during the 1948-1949 campaign, illustrated the sociological feature of the region by analyzing, in comparison, the expected values of the recently assumed planned economy and the existing work force. The conclusions were worrisome. Despite the fact that the central leadership of the state continued to increase the steel production rates, the number of workers inhabiting Hunedoara was outnumbered by the migratory work force. In fact, most of the steelworks’ employees were rural population, commuting to the city on a daily basis and continuing to lead a traditional way of life within their village communities of origin. As a result, answers were searched for drawing up a systematization program and advancing design solutions that were to provide the workers with dwellings where living standards would be similar to those they had in their home communities, yet with modern, standardized amenities designed on a scientific basis. In terms of ideological investment, the focus was, of course, to implement locally the Soviet urban typologies.[11]

Formulating a systematization project was part of the reconstruction strategies elaborated all over war-devastated Europe; the national space would be re-conceptualized based on a liberal reading of progress and the political use of meaningful concepts: institutions, state interventionism, legislation, functionality, economic efficiency, local administrative autonomy, etc. Accordingly, reevaluating the regional significance within the national system was achieved by using bureaucratic strategies to delegate the decision-making responsibility to the local structures. This practice echoed the state’s priority of handling complex territorial structures via establishing a balanced system amid heterogeneous economic regions and maintaining the social cohesion between the urban and rural areas through goods and cultural exchanges. Theoretically, the project started from the assumption that villages and cities represented the basic organizational structures of society, and their continuous growth was determined by social trends – urbanization, individualization and socialization –, while the state’s involvement through planning, institutional coercion and legislative initiative would maintain the project’s long term feasibility.[12] For the communists, however, the interest in regional structures had first and foremost an ideological reasoning. They were interested in eliminating the differences between the rural and urban areas, so that, in Marxist terms, the capital accumulation, and control over the production means would generate the homogenous economic socialist system and, therefore, the socialist consciousness of the masses. This effected into an alteration of the notion of regionalism, in its aforementioned reading, by transferring the decisional competence to the centralized structures away from the local authorities. In the long run, the dialectical-materialist vision would be creating a new class order through centralized economic planning.[13]

Officially assumed by the political leadership as part of the party’s effort to replace the existing ‘class project’ with a new democratic vision, the spatial reconfiguration of the local economic and social relations had a surprising turn.[14] As the ideological canon of socialist realism delineated well formulated standards of architectural representation, research campaigns to evaluate the local dwelling customs came to complete the decision-making’s dynamic and their findings aimed to integrate quickly and efficiently the new urban solutions into a supposedly authentic Romanian socialist-realist tradition. However, since the institutional configuration framed the texture of society during the Cold War, the construction of Hunedoara at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s should be approached in terms of individual responsibility versus institutional engagement, and of architectural knowledge and professional debate versus political-mindedness.[15]

As such, the data gathered locally during 1948 were sent to Bucharest where the Architects’ Association was appointed to undertake the groundwork planning. Therefore, in 1949 at the Institute for Planning and Construction in the Romanian Ministry of Construction (IPC) headquarters in Bucharest, Stefan Popovici and Adrian Gheorghiu began research for drawing the systematization plan for Hunedoara. Architects claimed they were inspired by “the Soviet ethnographic methodology of regional analysis and research,” and N. Bădescu’s 1950 article, “Against cosmopolitism and bourgeois architecture,” which opposed cosmopolitism and formalism to socialist realism. In this respect, the Urbanism Department recommended the establishment of two new structures under the Department of Research of the Ministry of Construction that had to gather relevant documentary material on architectural heritage and translate integrally into Romanian the Soviet ideological texts. Furthermore, in 1950, the Urbanism Department organized two successive research campaigns in Hunedoara, which had to center around regional architecture typology and construction materials. Architects explained their choice to focus on Hunedoara because “there was about to be created an important industrial centre and a socialist city, and because it was located in Transylvania, where issues related to the national arts were more complicated.”[16] As such, the campaign in Hunedoara, started in 1949, was the beginning of extensive professional debates on the architect’s social role and the use of vernacular heritage as a national art, and announced changes that were about to shake from the ground up both the profession and the planning practice. The arguments placed behind the program in Hunedoara conveyed a socialist-realist agenda in line with previously expressed principles of architecture’s social function. The program should be read on two levels.

On one hand, by the beginning of 1951, Petre Antonescu, a long-standing figure of Romanian architecture had observed: “the local heritage of the Hunedoara region uncovered an architecture capable of reflecting reality and endowing each building with natural beauty.”[17] The appeal to regional architecture in creating patterns for social dwellings targeted Bădescu’s idea that socialist-realist architecture had to be “national in form and socialist in content.” Accordingly, the local vernacular architecture would be studied from the perspective of space distribution, building proportions, and connections between form and function, and would provide the designers with the bases for future socialist-realist architecture and standardized construction patterns.[18]

On the other hand, the systematization project, drawn for the region, opened up discussion on the issue of standardization in construction, development of large urban estates, and later use of pre-fabricated materials in building manufacture. ARLUS and the Ministry of Construction hosted a lecture series, featuring Gustav Gusti, H. Delavrancea, and Daniel Farb, which was soon followed by several planning contests at the IPC.[19] The jury, led by Gustav Gusti, now transformed into a local theoretician of Soviet architectural ideology, selected several dwelling types and argued that they could provide the architects with an easy start in planning, which would help them eliminate “the cosmopolite influence though the use of regional forms.”[20] The projects proposed over-sized variations on the vernacular architecture, in terms of both roof geometry and ground imprint, with two-room apartments puzzled together in order to fit the rectangular building’s perimeter. The furnishing solutions were adapted to serve a minimal space of no more than 45 square meters per dwelling, while the finishes and amenities were distributed according to the designers’ individual preferences. In evaluating the projects, resemblance with the traditional building played the main cart.[21]

In spite of these research campaigns, by the time the second building phase began in Hunedoara, neither had the systematization plan been approved, nor had the dwelling pattern been typified. Nevertheless, the demand for dwellings made officials complete a new urban project in Hunedoara, which was the outcome of the aforementioned professional interactions. Designed by D. Hardt, Cezar Lăzărescu, R. Moisescu, and V. Perceac, it was constructed between 1949 and 1951. The project, initiated in 1949 parallel with the First Annual Economic plan, which had foreseen an industrial boom, and finalized in 1951, proposed a more compact urban structure, with two-storey buildings. The blocks had two-room apartments, and the interior space’s dimensions had been substantially narrowed down to forty square meters per dwelling.[22] These flats had spatial planning featuring rooms that opened one into another without a corridor or hallway, which affected the functionality of the dwelling and allowed inhabitants little privacy. Out of twenty considered, only seven buildings were constructed. In 1950, the authorities hoped to gain “maximal satisfaction by permanently meeting the material and cultural needs of the entire local community by successfully engaging technical findings in the construction industry of the almost perfect socialist society.”[23]

 

Bureaucratic Construct and Institutional Consolidation

 

In 1952, the Romanian political leadership, which, until then, had ignored almost entirely the dwelling industry, made a sudden turn towards aesthetics and reevaluated the socialist urban spaces. Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, for instance, stated that although “we began constructing new cities because funny buildings were being erected,” the national plan of urban development needed to be sanctioned by the Soviet comrades. Only after such consent was formally granted, would standardized dwelling patterns, comprising the best living amenities, be designed so that they could address efficiently the issue of socialist city:

 

Comrade Chivu [Stoica] knows that when the building campaign had started in Hunedoara many were enthusiastic about the sight: beautiful houses nothing more than some beautiful boxes, with yards, chicken coops, pigsties, spaces to raise cows, and so much more. It is so beautiful to take visitors there. Look what a beautiful little town we built in Hunedoara, on a surface we could have achieved so much more. Like a gypsy tribe![24]

 

At the same time, officials from the Romanian central leadership demanded the buildings erected in Hunedoara since 1947 be demolished. They argued that, as long as the existing urban space did not conform to the ideological canons of socialist-realist architectural representations, there was no solid reason why the buildings should continue to be kept in place. Furthermore, the irreconcilable recent mistakes, in terms of both planning and design, needed to be rapidly eliminated, before they made effects on the supposedly correct line in architectural professional practice. Explanations strictly related to the ideological correctness of the project made direct references to concepts like ‘peace campaign’, ‘patriotism’, ‘anti-cosmopolitism’, and, in spite of the generally admitted fact that inside the city there was a severe dwelling shortage, ideology was much more influential in the first instance. Such proposals came as a surprise as over the previous years, authorities had saved no effort in claiming that Hunedoara was the very illustration of modern socialism. Indeed, skimming through the Romanian press between 1948 and 1950 unveils a growing interest in the city; according to the official propaganda, it conveyed the ideological and economic aspiration of the communist power, and it illustrated the creation of the “new man” based on Marxist experiences of the space. It was the same city, however, that by the time it was finished, resembled more the modernist designs than socialist-realist projects.

The hasty understanding of the correctness of the socialist space was, in fact, an echo of the Romanian politicians’ reactions to the pressures of I. A. Zvezdin, the Soviet councilor on architecture in the country, whose activity on the Romanian building sites produced some very critical notes forwarded to the Council of Ministers. About Hunedoara, for instance, Zvezdin argued that the architects’ involvement in the program was problematic, which affected negatively bureaucratic coherence, keeping up with the systematization plans, and accessing financial resources or building materials. The Soviet official analyzed the functioning of the state’s institutions and architectural planning structures, as well as their interactions, and argued that unless drastic measures be taken up immediately, the efficiency of the national development program, and the prospects of the command economy would become problematic. Zvezdin supported his theoretical argumentation on the socialist-realist principle of “national in form and socialist in content,” stating that Romanian architecture, dominated until that moment by bourgeois influences, promoted formalism and cosmopolitanism and put to bed the traditional values of the people. Furthermore, such an option contravened the socio-economic reality of the moment according to which planning had to be based on “scientific arguments” which would facilitate the country’s “future balanced development.”[25]

This generated a twofold perspective on the city. On one hand, using the socialist-realist rhetoric as a theoretical principle for creating a new life style, according to which the state had to transpose politics into visual representations, exacerbated the urban space’s formative function to shape the new man. On the other hand, the economic program’s priority of developing the heavy industry absorbed the entire financial resources available, and therefore, jeopardized the finalization of the city. As such, the political reading of the socialist-realist aesthetic and its impact upon the built environment became the fruit of negotiated agreements between actors – politicians and architects – and institutional structures over how the workers’ needs should be addressed.[26] The Romanian authorities, pressured to copy the Soviet bureaucratic model that was simultaneously being shaped in the Soviet Union, sought to reconsider the hierarchies within the state under the incoming institutional and ideological requirements. Inexperienced and missing any political legitimacy before 1944, the communist party looked up to the Moscow-led development strategy as the best way to achieve progress goals, and made scarce efforts to adapt it to the local realities. This inflexible attitude was transposed into the radical measures that emerged on the public scene, such as bringing Hunedoara down, among other things. The heterogeneous cultural and social environment and the fragile bureaucratic system newly set up, however, became disturbing factors in this process. For instance, the building program required the involvement of a large number of institutional structures both in the central administration and in the local bureaucracy. Sketched by several ministries given the requirements of the command economy, the program would be implemented by local structures that were first responsible to the central government, and only after, to the local administrative organizations. Accordingly, the local authorities’ frequent complains over access to resources and inefficiency in handling the programs depicted an atmosphere of chaos, decision-making blockages, and fierce competition over resources.[27]

To address these shortcomings, the politicians were forced to find alternative solutions that had to accommodate in a unitary development strategy the ideological and pragmatic requirements. Bringing the city down was postponed until the housing capacity would suffice, but the radicalism of the politicians’ visions echoed debates about architecture’s function within the socialist construct and its capability of subscribing to the socialist-realist dictum “national in form and socialist in content.”[28] Revisiting the urban project in Hunedoara did not mean that the decision-making factors were shifting aesthetic priorities or were reconsidering the maneuver space they were willing to afford architects. On the contrary, starting with the 1952 institutionalization of architectural practice strict control over professional structures sought to bring design under political control. However, the moment coincided with the launching of what historians have called the “new economic course” in Romania’s development, according to which the shift from heavy industrial investments to housing and consumption goods industry produced a re-conceptualization of modernization priorities within the communist state. The solution was found in the words of Stalin who arguably stated: “one of the fundamental requirements of reaching communism demands us to improve the living standards.”[29] Pressured by the obvious ideological truth, Gheorghiu-Dej had no alternative but to admit that measures had to be taken to redress a “difficult” situation emerging from the dangerous discrepancies between the fast marching of the heavy industry and the questionable coverage of the social needs. In fact, this was not a surprise as the political actions of the previous years, both in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, had not succeeded in addressing the social needs of the masses.[30] Accordingly, the approach of urban space was about to be reconsidered under the growing influence of prefabricated building technology, and also of the new structural reconfiguration of state-led politics, which stressed the need to raise the dwellings’ number and improve the building technology. Within this context, the integration of the working class in the supposedly correct socialist-realist tradition would be achieved based on structural changes in politics and consumerist economic investments.

 

Conclusion

 

The political act of shifting borders within the Soviet sphere of influence was counter-balanced by the changing boundaries of institutions, understood here as a complex concept cumulating bureaucratic structures, professional practices, cultural options and patterns of public behavior, which were repositioned under the varying socio-economic local conditions. The success of the building program in Hunedoara depended on the degree of penetrability of professional circles and state-led institutions, and their availability to comply, absorb and adjust their actions, and eventually, their personal reading of the program. As such, a first level of negotiation occurred between architects and the incoming socialist-realist aesthetics. Under personal experiences, previous professional practices, training and design options, architects came up with a development plan that, to some extent, met the Soviets’ requirements to form, but did not fulfill the socialist-like modernization ideology. This was best evinced by the first attempts to sketch a systematization plan in the late 1940s. On the next level, politicians performed a different reading of modernization by taking into account the ideology according to which the heavy industry development would generate progress in domains like urbanization, the consumption goods industry, or the dwelling sector. The subsequent re-evaluation of the building strategies as a result of the new economic course opened up the way for an alternative understanding, by re-formulating the meaning of the existing urban space in Hunedoara every time the political context required it.

 

 

Bibliography:

Bădescu, Nicolae. “Impotriva cosmopolitismului şi arhitecturii burgheze imperialiste.” Arhitectura 1 (1950): 5-17.

Baudin, Antoine. “’Why is Soviet Painting Hidden From Us?’ Zhdanov Art and Its International Relations and Fallout, 1947-1953.” In Socialist Realism without Shores, eds. Thomas Lahusen and Evgeni Dobrenko. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

Boterbloem, C. N. “The Death of Andrei Zhdanov.” SEER 2 (2002):

Castillo, Greg. “People at an Exhibition.” South Atlantic Quarterly 3 (1995): 715-746.

Cooke, Catherine, and Susan Reid. “Modernity and Realism: Architectural Relations in the Cold War.” In Russian Art and the West: a Century of Dialogue in Painting, Architecture, and the Decorative Arts, eds. Rosalind P. Blakesley and Susan E. Reid. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007.

Crowter, William. The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism. New York: Praeger, 1988.

DiMaggio, Paul, Walter Powell. „The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” In The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, eds. W. Powell and P. DiMaggio. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Duskin, Eric. Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a New Elite, 1945-1953. Pargrave Mcmillan, 2001.

Enescu, Ion Mircea. Arhitect sub comunism. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2007.

Filtzer, Donald. Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labor and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Foucault, Michael. “Space, Knowledge and Power.” In Michel Foucault. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Power, vol. III., ed. James D. Faubion. Penguin Books, 2002.

Gorlizki, Yoram and Oleg Khlevniuk. Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Greceanu, Eugenia. “Sovietizarea învăţamântului în arhitectură.” In Arhitecţi în timpul dictaturii. Amintiri, ed. Viorica Curea. Bucureşti: Simetria, 2005.

Montias. Economic Development in Communist Romania. Cambridge, MA,: MIT Press, 1967.

Martin, Terry. “Modernization or Neo-traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism.” In Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices, ed. David Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.

Mevius, Martin. Agents of Moscow: the Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism, 1941-1953. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Murawska-Muthesius, Katarzyna. “Modernism between Peace and Freedom: Picasso and Others at the Congress of Intellectuals in Wroclaw, 1948.” In Cold War Modern, eds. Jane Pavitt and David Crowley. London: V&A Publishing, 2008.

O’Leary, Brendan. “The Elements of Right-Sizing and Right-Peopling the State.” In Right-Sizing the State: the Politics of Moving Borders, eds. Brendan O’Leary, Ian Lustick, and Thomas M. Callaghy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Parrish, Scott. “The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe.” In The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, eds. Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

Pollock, Ethan. “Stalin as a Coryphaeus of Science: Ideology and Knowledge in the Post-war Years.” In Stalin: A New History, eds. Sarah Davies, James R. Harris. Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Popescu, Carmen. Industria Românei în secolul XX. Analiză geografică. Bucureşti: Oscar Print, 2000.

Rautu, Leonte. Impotriva cosmopolitismului si obiectivismului burghez in stiintele sociale. Bucuresti: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, 1949.

Scott, James, C. In numele statului. Modele esuate de imbunatatire a conditiei umane. Iasi: Polirom, 2007.

Tismaneanu Vladimir, and Cristian Vasile. „Un Jdanov roman: Leonte Rautu, arhitectul Sectiei de Propaganda.” In Perfectul acrobat: Leonte Rautu, mastile raului, ed. V. Timaneanu. Bucuresti; Humanitas, 2008.

Verdery, Katherine. What Was Socialism and What Comes Next? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Zubkova, Elena. Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.

 

 

Notes