

Paul Mihai Paraschiv

## Uncovering the Self: Identity and Otherness in Irish Fiction (Barry, Beckett and Banville)

---

**Abstract:** Fiction seems to be bound to the discovery of the self and the other. By engaging in ethical readings, literature can become a fruitful space of interaction in which the reader and text can communicate in order to make an acquaintance with otherness. In this regard, the present paper consists of several analyses on Irish fiction that propose explorations into the quest of self-discovery. As it stands, self-identity is iterated in terms of knowing both the self and the other and therefore discovering alterity. Through the works of Barry, Beckett and Banville, we intend to demonstrate various approaches towards self-identity and analyse how they came into fruition.

**Keywords:** Irish Fiction; Sebastian Barry; Samuel Beckett; John Banville; Self-Identity; Ethical Reading; Otherness; Alterity.

**PAUL MIHAI PARASCHIV**

Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania  
paul.mihai97@gmail.com

DOI: 10.24193/cechinox.2021.41.12

Irish fiction is seen to frequently render characters that epitomise the quest of self-discovery. Be it through original accounts of historical events, absurd and mundane realities or personal memoirs, Irish writers are found to have a taste for the inquiry of the self and intend to approach such questions with a neoteric point of view that allows the reader to apprehend a multiplicity of identities in their quest to be discovered. To that extent, this paper intends to analyse how self-identity is measured in the works of Sebastian Barry (*A Long Long Way*), Samuel Beckett (*Murphy* and *Film*) and John Banville (*The Sea*) in order to ascertain how their characters are portrayed in their attempt to find their selfhood, while at the same time paying close attention to the intervention of otherness in the process. Each novel discussed in this paper provides a distinctive representation of selfhood, proving thus that the subject brings about a particularly regenerative investigation into the quest of self-discovery.

**Knowing Your Own Other:  
Willy Dunne's Alterity**  
in *A Long Long Way*

In an attempt to define "ethical reading" we ponder upon Mark Sander's definition of literature as an "other-maker"<sup>1</sup>. Fiction gives way to the exploration of alterity, which seems to be the decisive factor in the evaluation of ethical knowledge. As such, an ethical reading should, in theory, have as an end the discovery of the other, advancing towards it by entering in a sphere of interaction with the narrative. According to Butler and Hale<sup>2</sup>, the interaction postulates that previous knowledge and the past assumptions should be dropped in order to fully engage in an ethical reading. Furthermore, the relationship that the self of the reader creates with the other (through the "power struggle") ultimately releases him/her of the social constraints formerly ingrained in them by binding the otherness to the self and allowing the other to emerge. As such, the restriction that fiction insinuates is not merely an aesthetic or mimetic confinement given to the reader by the author<sup>3</sup>, but a fruitful enclosure in which alterity can be found and the acquaintance with the other can be made. Dorothy J. Hale also makes it clear that an ethical reading implies a definite intentionality from the part of the reader, as volition is determined by the following question:

Will I submit to the alterity that the novel allows? An affirmative answer launches the novel reader into a transactional relation with another agent, an agent defined by its Otherness from the reader. I want to show

that although this agent is variously identified across the theories as author, characterological point of view, narrative, text, and even law, no matter what name it is given, its function for these new ethical theorists is the same. This agent is the social Other that is produced by two related readerly acts: the act of self-subordination that enables the apprehension of alterity; and a prior act that makes self-subordination itself possible—the will to believe in the possibility of alterity.<sup>4</sup>

It is this possibility of alterity that gives birth to the ethical reader. Once presented with the opportunity, it is the reader's task to engage in the ontological assemblage offered by the narrative and to give in to the external forces coming from the Other. As such, the ethical subject is born out of the Other, moulded by the encounter and continuously defined in relation to it. Hale and Adam Newton seem to agree that this "readerly emotion"<sup>5</sup> awoken by the alterity presented in the text marks the birth of the ethical reader and they both acknowledge that, in the process, to be bound with the other is the imperative response for this achievement:

[E]thics' refers to the radicality and uniqueness of the moral situation itself, a binding claim exercised upon the self by a concrete and singular other whose moral appeal precedes both decision and understanding. . . . One of my claims here is that certain kinds of textuality parallel this description of ethical encounter in several obvious ways. Cutting athwart the mediatory role of reason, narrative situations

create an immediacy and force, framing relations of provocation, call, and response that bind narrator and listener, author and character, or reader and text. Again, these relations will often precede decision and understanding, with consciousness arriving late, after the assumption or imposition of intersubjective ties. In this sense, prose fiction translates the interactive problematic of ethics into literary forms.<sup>6</sup>

One of the pieces of fiction that allows for the exploration of the other is Sebastian Barry's *A Long Long Way* (2005). In his text, Barry intends to tell the uncharted story of a young man enrolling into the army during the First World War. Steering away from traditional ways of historical narratives, Barry manages to give voice to a secluded character that embodies the Other. His novel does not seek to factually represent history and the horrors of the war, but to have the reader acquainted with an often elusive character that certainly played an important role in the war, having to fill the gaps between the numerous heroic deeds and terrifying events.

We might therefore characterize *A Long Long Way* as well-researched, politically engaged, unironic historiographic fiction that actively solicits the reader's sympathy for its anomalous and decidedly innocent protagonists, to whom the author wishes to extend full humanity. The rhetorical means by which Barry garners and sustains such sympathy will be a key part of our explorations, because this is a novelist who wants as few barriers as possible to his readers' identifying

with his pitiful protagonists and succumbing to narrative illusion.<sup>7</sup>

Since the author's intent is to have his readers empathise with the character, we can already see how the text is almost demanding for identification. Barry's perception of an ethical encounter is based on an effort to bathe his protagonist in a sea of sympathy. He expects of the reader the exact same reaction: Willie's sympathy for the subjects that surround him is doubled by the reader's sympathy for the character. The binding effect that takes place at the time of the reading makes it almost impossible to not feel compassionate and responsive towards the deeds and thoughts of young Willie. As such, the "narrative illusion" that Harte discusses and Barry puts forward is decidedly aware of its own breeding force: it delivers a character whose innocence and congeniality is almost from the start put under the aegis of death and sorrow: "The pith of sorrow was in the upshot a little seed of death."<sup>8</sup> Willie is stripped of most of the characteristics of a young eighteen-year old boy. He becomes a sort of palimpsest, a blank canvas on which the war gets to write its own history as his youth is "submerged in a killing sea from which no one might emerge."<sup>9</sup> Elizabeth DeMott comments:

But this is less Barry's project in *A Long, Long Way* than is his commitment to presenting his main character, an unselfconscious Willie Dunne, as wholly passive in the face of the overwhelming force of history: [...] This strategy allows both Willie Dunne, fighting in the First World War, and Barry's present-day readers,

who desperately need to recognize the complex history of Irish involvement in the First World War in order to move forward, to either disavow responsibility for the perpetuation of simplistic historical narratives or lament an Ireland lost forever.<sup>10</sup>

Although her argument seems to be going in the same direction as what I have indicated above, I believe that it takes a wrong turn when she decides to describe Willie as being “passive.” It is true that Willie’s impact on history could easily pass unnoticed, but to allow for such a binary resolution as the choice to reject or deplore the country’s outlook is not what *A Long Long Way* intends to portray. Moreover, I feel that the readership is entirely entitled to oversee the historicity of the narrative in order to pursue an even more immersive account of the protagonist’s heterogeneity. As Harte argues: “So careful is Barry to protect his protagonist’s political and moral inviolability that he freezes him a state of arrested development that tests the limits of the reader’s suspension of disbelief.”<sup>11</sup> The book allows for an ethical reading that is based almost entirely on the reader’s capacity to be open towards the Otherness provided by Willie. Barry’s novel does indeed manage to leave a trace of the tragic, a looming affect that reiterates the call for sympathy. There are various instances when the omniscient narrator places Willie in overtly traumatising settings, being “born in the dying days”<sup>12</sup> or finding himself “possessed of an utter fear of this dark and seemingly infernal thing creeping along.”<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, there are also moments in which Willie could be held accountable for his immoral actions, like in

the case of his unfaithfulness to Greta, and for this he will be heavily castigated, as he seems to never arrive at a point to “know [his] own mind.”<sup>14</sup>

The protagonists’ staggering naivety and innocuousness are so heavily ring-fenced by the exonerative narration and sentimental characterization that psychological verisimilitude and historical plausibility are sometimes stretched to breaking point.<sup>15</sup>

The alterity that Willie brings to the novel straightforwardly confronts Harte’s affirmation regarding the truth value of the narrative. Willie’s short-lived existence shifts the focus of the novel towards a much more personal account of history. There is no need for factualness in the story of Willie Dunne. His mere presence of his self as Other arbitrarily leads the reader towards the essential prospect of *A Long Long Way*: the identification of the reader with the protagonist is doubled by Willie’s identification with the war itself, and even further than that, with the enemy. Coming together with a German soldier in their singing demonstrates Willie’s attempt at bonding with the only thing that he still has left. His hamartia is not that he intended to find kinship with the enemy, but that his entire history was constructed by the relationships that he had with his family and Greta. Once those relationships disappear, Willie finds himself in an oblivious state, perpetually seeking a connection with another.

As O’Toole has pointed out, Barry specialises in “history’s leftovers, men and women defeated and discarded

by their times. [...] They are misfits, anomalies, outlanders.” His particular affinity is for historically obscured individuals who, because of their personal choices, public duties, or political allegiances, have been excluded from the Irish nationalist master-narrative.<sup>16</sup>

What is at fault in many readings of the novel is the fact that critics tend to either avoid or completely be unaware of the protagonist’s stance as one of these excluded characters from the canon of historical writings. The novelty that Willie Dunne as a character brings to the table is formidable for its forceful demand for awareness. The acquaintance with the Other is welcoming to anybody that is willing to pursue an ethical reading. Barry’s narrative provides a baggage of ethical knowledge that grows out of Willie’s character in a myriad of ways. The novel does not demand for an active implication, as the readership will find it extremely uncomplicated to access the Otherness.

### Non-Being in Samuel Beckett’s Works

In order to provide a polar opposite reaction to otherness, we should delve into the works of Samuel Beckett and observe how his characters intend to deny its presence. In trying to discuss the self in Beckett’s work, we ponder upon its representation in various stages. The self in Beckett’s writing is seen to be always split, as the characters usually tend to resort to a sort of escapism from the mundane reality in which they seem to be trapped. I propose to take a look at two Beckettian characters

in order to define the ways in which the author intends to break away from such a confinement. In this respect, Murphy and O are seen to be prepared to liberate themselves and they intend to transcend the ordinary through similar means.

Delving into “Murphy’s mind”, we encounter a character that aims to live in the solace of his thoughts. Described as a “large hollow sphere, hermetically closed to the universe without”<sup>17</sup>, Murphy’s mind becomes a sort of non-place in the Augerian sense, where virtuality is seen to be the only building block of its structure. Being “self-sufficient and impermeable to the vicissitudes of the body”<sup>18</sup>, it relies only on the immaterial in order to exist, as the physical consequences of Murphy’s being in the world are converted before entering his mind through a process that the character (and at the same time the author) is quite unable to explain. Therefore, Murphy enters a becoming process in which his persona is ultimately divided: “He was split, one part of him never left this mental chamber that pictured itself as a sphere full of light fading into dark, because there was no way out. But motion in this world depended on rest in the world outside.”<sup>19</sup>

It is here where we can make the first comparison with O. In the first part of *Film*, O is being *seen* in the outside world, intending to flee the pursuing of E. At the same time, O is also trying to escape the sight of other participants present in the world, and his intent falls short when he stumbles upon a couple that manage to perceive his existence. It seems that the world outside, being as arbitrary or contingent as possible, posits a threat to the existence of the (inner) self. In this respect, both Murphy and O are trying to find ways

of shortening their presence amongst others, which can disturb the purity of their immanence. As Murphy's mind "excluded nothing that it did not itself contain"<sup>20</sup>, so does O's pursuit of confinement in his mother's room can be thought in terms of exclusion of otherness from a place that is already full of it. They both become "a mote in its absolute freedom"<sup>21</sup> when their becoming processes come to fruition. This is also clear if we are to make a comparison between the presence of the other characters in the vicinity of our protagonists: the Ticklepennies, Miss Carridges and Belacquas do not have the power to keep Murphy in the real world, as is the case with the couple on O's street or the woman from the stairwell. Moreover, they can instead act as originators or propagators of the desire to only be with oneself.

At the same time, apart from the absolute refusal of otherness – which is also seen in animal form – the reader/viewer of *Film* is met with an imposed limitation that, once again, does not permit the meeting of O's self. The "angle of immunity"<sup>22</sup> devised by Beckett intends to offer, through E's perception, an insufficiency of access into O's world. This is also backed up by the complete absence of sound and the obstruction of any other gaze that can perceive our main character, while "self-perception maintains in being"<sup>23</sup>. However, it is this self-perception that O also intends to escape and finds himself unable to do so even though his immunity is fostered by the author. The road to non-being is, from the beginning, blocked under the aegis of the Berkeleyan doctrine *esse est percipi*. However, it is the flight from E's perception that seems to carry the weight of O's becoming. Through fleeing, O's immanence is placed

under an "anguish of perceivedness"<sup>24</sup> which only makes it harder for the character to obtain solace in solitude. Such is the case with Murphy as well, although he seems to have another way of achieving it:

The third, the dark, was a flux of forms, a perpetual coming together and falling asunder of forms. The light contained the docile elements of a new manifold, the world of the body broken up into the pieces of a toy; the half light, states of peace. But the dark neither elements nor states, nothing but forms becoming and crumbling into the fragments of a new becoming, without love or hate or any intelligible principle of change. Here there was nothing but commotion and the pure forms of commotion. Here he was not free, but a mote in the dark of absolute freedom. He did not move, he was a point in the ceaseless unconditioned generation and passing away of line.<sup>25</sup>

In this case, Murphy translates the inner self by way of light, or rather, lack of light. The becoming process is commencing by achieving a state of darkness, as the process is also iterated in *Imagination Dead Imagine* ("Emptiness, silence, heat, whiteness, wait, the light goes down, all grows dark together, ground, wall, vault, bodies, say twenty seconds, all the greys, the light goes out, all vanishes"<sup>26</sup>). In *Film*, Beckett intends to solve one of the technical problems that might arise during the screening through changes in luminosity, which have to be "flagrant"<sup>27</sup>. Thus, this might mean that the disparity of lighting is one of the mediums through which otherness can be excluded and therefore, the self is then able

to achieve a state in which it can maintain its solace. Moreover, darkness is a natural way of obstruction vision and as such, works in favour of O's attempt. He can escape the "eye of prey"<sup>28</sup>, be it human, animal or divine by immersing himself in an obscure environment. Nevertheless, Beckett does not stop here with O. As we are to find out, "the pursuing perceiver is not extraneous but the self"<sup>29</sup>, making it thus impossible for the character to achieve a state of non-being.

There is one more attempt that both Murphy and O can make in order to access or escape their immanent self: rocking in a chair. The swaying motion performed by the characters can take a new meaning in this respect as a sort of transcendental ritual that needs to be performed in order to achieve the state of non-being. In this respect, O can manage to not be in order to not be perceived, while Murphy utilises the movement as an access gate to his mind. We can observe how Beckett intends to find ways of escaping the ordinary allure of the world in his work. Through characters such as Murphy and O, the author is exploring the necessary elements that must be taken into consideration in order to enter a becoming process that ultimately retorts into non-being. While the meeting with otherness is seen as an initiator of such a process, it also raises questions about the necessity of engaging with alterity in such an absurd world.

### **Recovered Self: Past Self-identity in John Banville's *The Sea***

**I**n his 2005 novel *The Sea*, John Banville brings to the table a different approach to self-discovery. Through his main character

Max Morden, the author intends to outline an exploration of the self by means of (re)telling the past. In this regard, we are acquainted with a first person narrator who tells his story in three time stages: his childhood with the Graces, his adulthood around the time of his wife's illness and subsequent death, and the present stay at The Cedars when he is old. Throughout the telling of the story, Max finds various approaches towards the discovery of his inner persona, while the most prominent one remains the return to his past.

Right from the start, Morden frames his entire story within the boundaries set by his own history, returning "to live amidst the rubble of the past"<sup>30</sup>, when everything was placed under the aura of the uncanny. He goes even further, admitting that the events that took place in his childhood are forever ingrained in his present state, as "[t]he past beats inside [him] like a second heart."<sup>31</sup> This revelation becomes the guiding proposition for the characterisation of our protagonist. Morden's inescapability from the past prompts him to undergo a thorough investigation of the events that succeeded in the year he encountered the Graces in the village of Ballyless. At the same time, he is also bound to the much later discovery of his wife's illness, tying himself up to another past event that frames his identity.

With this in mind, we discover how Morden unveils his selfhood through the lens of an already established past that he is constantly visiting. His sense of self-identity is coming to surface in these craved dwellings, with many and often introspections made into the veracity of such occurrences. These inquiries are made to manifest Morden's ultimate ordeal: to discover and understand his self-identity by realising that his

selfhood is at the same time an otherness that he must uncover, but also recognise. The first hint towards this realisation proves to be an unfamiliar gaze that he directs towards his present state: "Odd, how often I see myself like this these days, at a distance, being someone else and doing things that only someone else would do."<sup>32</sup> Adding up to the cause, Morden also disclaims his disdain for mirrors, in which he cannot find himself:

On the subject of observing and being observed, I must mention the long, grim gander I took at myself in the bathroom mirror this morning. Usually these days I do not dally before my reflection any longer than is necessary. There was a time when I quite liked what I saw in the looking glass, but not any more. Now I am startled, and more than startled, by the visage that so abruptly appears there, never and not at all the one that I expect. I have been elbowed aside by a parody of myself, a sadly dishevelled figure in a Hallowe'en mask made of sagging, pinkish-grey rubber that bears no more than a passing resemblance to the image of what I look like that I stubbornly retain in my head.<sup>33</sup>

In this passage, we are reminded that the protagonist carries with him a different conception of his physical appearance, one that is also pertaining to the past. Morden is unable to accept the state of his body in the present time and places the blame on the reflective object. His immaterial otherness is thus doubled by the alienated version of his body, which makes him drift into the memory of the past once again. As we find out early in the narrative, Morden was not

quite fond of his physical appearance before finding out about his wife's illness. Being constantly aware of his "sadly inescapable humanity"<sup>34</sup>, he discovers, after the death of Anna, that he cannot tolerate the processes through which his body alters. With this confession, we are made aware that Morden intends not only to live in the memories of his younger self, but also inhibits any rendering of an aging body, claiming that "We never grow up. I never did, anyway."<sup>35</sup> We can assume that such discouraging thoughts stem from Max's traumatic experiences. The deaths of his two childhood friends and of his wife make him put a barrier on anything that could subscribe to the passing of time. In his attempt to stop time in its tracks, Morden wonders whether his approach is practical as a means of hiding from the damage done by years going by:

Before, I saw myself as something of a buccaneer, facing all-comers with a cutlass in my teeth, but now I am compelled to acknowledge that this was a delusion. To be concealed, protected, guarded, that is all I have ever truly wanted, to burrow down into a place of wombly warmth and cower there, hidden from the sky's indifferent gaze and the harsh air's damagings. That is why the past is just such a retreat for me, I go there eagerly, rubbing my hands and shaking off the cold present and the colder future. And yet, what existence, really, does it have, the past? After all, it is only what the present was, once, the present that is gone, no more than that. And yet.<sup>36</sup>

His hopeful tone places the entire evaluation of Morden's identity into the hands



of the past. From this moment on, Morden's existence is entirely devoted to remembering, returning to a past that has become his shelter against the tragedies of the present. Moreover, while reminiscing about the moment in which, as a child, he thought about his future, Morden notices that his ideal posterity was moulded by images of an even more antiquated time, when he "was, one might say, not so much anticipating the future as nostalgic for it, since what in my imaginings was to come was in reality already gone.[...] Was it actually the future I was looking forward to, or something beyond the future?"<sup>37</sup> It seems therefore that Max's self-identity has been constantly defined by his identification with a past time, whether it was his own or some other event that he did not experience. Therefore, the protagonist's strong adherence to precedence formulates an otherness with which he identifies at any point in his life. The past is converted into the only possible identity that Max could have, while his present persona is solely responsible for creating means of retrospection. In this regard, Morden notices that "one might almost live one's life over, if only one could make a sufficient effort of recollection."<sup>38</sup> There is one more aspect of Morden's self-consciousness that he is willingly announcing when prompted by the memory of Chloe, as he admits that the awakening of his self-consciousness began with her:

And if she was real, so, suddenly, was I. She was I believe the true origin in me of self-consciousness. Before, there had been one thing and I was part of it, now there was me and all that was not me. But here too there is a torsion, a kink of complexity. In severing me from the

world and making me realise myself in being thus severed, she expelled me from that sense of the immanence of all things, the all things that had included me, in which up to then I had dwelt, in more or less blissful ignorance. Before, I had been housed, now I was in the open, in the clearing, with no shelter in sight. I did not know that I would not get inside again, through that ever straitening gate.<sup>39</sup>

Since Chloe made it impossible for Max to understand her, our protagonist manages to distinguish himself from the otherness of his loved one. However, the prospect of getting to know the other appears to be problematic at a later stage, when Morden reminisces about Anna and finds that he had been too shallow in his interaction with her. This prompts another inquiry about his self-identity, as the narrator finds it hard to know another when he is incapable of knowing himself. Adding to the inability of self-discovery, we should also be attentive to the extent to which Morden is *present* in his interactions with the others. As it is the case with Murphy and O, the protagonist of *The Sea* is also seen to enter a state that transcends the reality of his present:

On occasion in the past . . . I had felt myself break through the membrane of mere consciousness into another state, on which had no name, where ordinary laws did not operate, where time moved differently if it moved at all, where I was neither alive nor the other thing and yet more vividly present than ever I could be in what we call, because we must, the real world.

And even years before that again, standing for instance with Mrs. Grace in that sunlit living room, or sitting with Chloe in the dark of the picture-house, I was there and not there, myself and revenant, immured in the moment and yet hovering somehow on the point of departure. Perhaps all of life is no more than a long preparation for the leaving of it.<sup>40</sup>

This apparent state of unconsciousness also brings forward the figure of the revenant, with whom Max is frequently seen to identify. A “phantom version”<sup>41</sup> of him whose presence only further emphasises the relevance of Morden’s recurrent return to the past. This translates into his present, where he is left to be a “sort of large dark simian something slumped there at the table, or not a something but a nothing, rather, a hole in the room, a palpable absence, a darkness visible.”<sup>42</sup> At this point, Morden is “becoming [his] own ghost”<sup>43</sup> in order to

haunt the past in which he could find his self-identity.

Whether they are bound to discover the other in its alterity and derive their selfhood from their surroundings, resort to states of non-being that are ultimately necessary for intrusions into the self, or decide to live in the past in order to pursue their self-discovery, the characters in the analysed novels are all examples of identity seekers whose goals are consolidated into one: to find and understand themselves as thoroughly as possible. Their self-identities, although stemming from distinctive methods of inquiry, are explored, questioned and experienced in order to render characters that are unique and that should be valued, both individually and collectively, as results of imaginative approaches towards the discovery of the self. In this regard, all three authors manage to bring to the table, through the individuals portrayed in their novels, ways of entering certain becoming processes with the intention of self-revelation.

## WORKS CITED

- Banville, John, *The Sea*, Kindle Edition, New York: Vintage Books, 2005.
- Barry, Sebastian, *A Long Long Way*, New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
- Beckett, Samuel, “Imagination Dead Imagine” in *The Complete Short Prose 1929-1989*, New York: Grove Press, 1995.
- Beckett, Samuel, “Film” in *The Complete Dramatic Works*, Faber and Faber, 1986.
- Beckett, Samuel, *Murphy*, Faber and Faber, 1938.
- Demott, Elizabeth Susan, ‘Ere their story die’: The Rhetoric of Historical Responsibility in Sebastian Barry’s *A Long, Long Way*, Report, 2011.
- Hale, Dorothy J, ‘Aesthetics and the New Ethics: Theorizing the Novel in the Twenty-First Century’, in *PMLA*, Vol. 124, No. 3, May 2009, pp. 896-905.
- Hale, Dorothy J, “Fiction as Restriction: Self-Binding in New Ethical Theories of the Novel”, in *Narrative*, Vol. 15, No. 2, May 2007.
- Harte, Liam, ‘The Politics of Pity: Sebastian Barry’s *A Long Long Way*’, in *Reading the Contemporary Irish Novel 1987-2007*, 2014.
- Newton, Adam Zachary, *Narrative Ethics*, Harvard University Press: 1997.
- Sanders, Mark, “Ethics and Interdisciplinarity in Philosophy and Literary Theory.” Introduction. *Ethics*. Ed. Sanders. Spec, issue of *Diacritics* Vol. 32, No. 3-4, 2002.

## NOTES

1. Sanders, Mark. "Ethics and Interdisciplinarity in Philosophy and Literary Theory." Introduction. *Ethics*. Ed. Sanders. Spec. issue of *Diacritics* 32.3-4, 2002, p. 4.
2. "We come to self-consciousness about our pretended certainty through the confrontation with alterity, an experience of the other that surprises us in its intractability, its refusal to conform to what we imagine we know – to fit into our personal 'regime of the norm' (to use D. A. Miller's term), the expectations that we call knowledge." from Dorothy J Hale. 'Aesthetics and the New Ethics: Theorizing the Novel in the Twenty-First Century', in *PMLA*, Vol. 124, No. 3, May 2009, p. 900.
3. "The author who must more or less use a character for his or her expressive ends is felt to be exploitative. The reader who identifies with a character worries about emotional colonization. And the reader and author who feel only the aesthetic thrill of a characters fate carry the guilt of the voyeur." *Ibidem*, p. 903.
4. Dorothy J. Hale, "Fiction as Restriction: Self-Binding in New Ethical Theories of the Novel", in *Narrative*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 2007), p. 189.
5. *Ibidem*, p. 190.
6. Adam Zachary Newton, *Narrative Ethics*, Harvard University Press: 1997, p. 12-13.
7. Liam Harte, 'The Politics of Pity: Sebastian Barry's *A Long Long Way*', in *Reading the Contemporary Irish Novel 1987-2007*, 2014, p. 201.
8. Sebastian Barry, *A Long Long Way*, New York: Penguin Books, 2005, p. 67.
9. *Ibidem*, p. 135.
10. Elizabeth Susan DeMott, 'Ere their story die': *The Rhetoric of Historical Responsibility in Sebastian Barry's A Long, Long Way*, Report, 2011, p. 5-6.
11. Liam Harte, *Op. cit.*, p. 213.
12. Sebastian Barry, *A Long Long Way*, p. 1.
13. *Ibidem*, p. 55.
14. *Ibidem*, p. 87.
15. Liam Harte, *Op. cit.*, p. 212.
16. *Ibidem*, p. 198.
17. Samuel Beckett, *Murphy*, Faber and Faber, 1938, p. 94.
18. *Ibidem*, p. 94.
19. *Ibidem*, p. 95.
20. *Ibidem*, p. 94.
21. *Ibidem*, p. 95.
22. *Idem*, "Film" in *The Complete Dramatic Works*, Faber and Faber, 1986, p. 283.
23. *Ibidem*, p. 283.
24. *Ibidem*, p. 283.
25. *Idem*, *Murphy*, p. 95.
26. *Idem*, "Imagination Dead Imagine" in *The Complete Short Prose 1929-1989*, New York: Grove Press, 1995, p. 170.
27. *Idem*, *Film*, p. 290.
28. *Idem*, *Imagination Dead Imagine*, p. 170.
29. *Idem*, *Film*, p. 283.
30. John Banville, *The Sea*, Kindle Edition, New York: Vintage Books, 2005, p. 4.
31. *Ibidem*, p. 8.
32. *Ibidem*, p. 24.
33. *Ibidem*, p. 71.
34. *Ibidem*, p. 39.
35. *Ibidem*, p. 42.
36. *Ibidem*, p. 34.

- 37. *Ibidem*, p. 53.
- 38. *Ibidem*, p. 87.
- 39. *Ibidem*, p. 91.
- 40. *Ibidem*, p. 54.
- 41. *Ibidem*, p. 75.
- 42. *Ibidem*, p. 105.
- 43. *Ibidem*, p. 105.